The Revolutionary Movement 

The revolutionary movement, which became a potent force in Indian politics during the Swadeshi movement, continued, with checks and breaks, up to the end of the Civil Disobedience movement of Gandhi. The two movements — one violent and another non-violent — went on side by side, and it was almost inevitable that each would be influenced by the other.

The idea of an armed rebellion still swayed the revolutionary party, but there was a more conscious attempt to bring the organization in line with the national movement and make revolutionary mentality more broad-based in the country by rousing the political consciousness of the people to the futility of Gandhian ways of non-violence and negotiations. Counteracting the Gandhian movement of non-violence and focusing the attention of the country on the supreme need for ‘Direct Action’ to achieve complete independence and to remove the lethargy in political activity were the chief objects of the revolutionaries. According to their own statement, the hunger strike in jail and the throwing of bombs on the floor of the Assembly Hall were inspired by this motive.

That these expedients quickened the national consciousness of the people and indirectly helped to create a favourable atmosphere for the growth of revolutionary mentality among ever-increasing circles is abundantly proven by the country-wide enthusiasm evoked by the hunger strike and martyrdom of Jatin Das as well as of Bhagat Singh and his comrades. A spontaneous movement developed and was centered around the hunger strike. June 30, 1929, was observed as Bhagat-Datta Memorial Day, and meetings were held in many places, especially in the Punjab.

The A.I.C.C. issued a circular to observe August 18, 1929, as “Political Sufferers’ Day” all over the country. The people held meetings and organized processions in defiance of Section 144, the lathi charges, and other oppressions of the police. The whole country seemed to reverberate with the new revolutionary cry of Inqilab Zindabad. (Long live the revolution.) The tumultuous enthusiasm for the revolutionary heroes particularly stirred the younger section, and even Gandhi had to bend before the new force in the Karachi Congress.

A notable feature of the revolutionary movement is that the ideology of the revolutionaries was more clearly formulated and widely promulgated. Some idea of it may be formed from the Joint Statement issued by Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta during their trial for the Assembly Bomb Case. After stating the reasons for throwing bombs, they proceeded to explain what ‘violence’ was and what was not:

“Force, when aggressively applied, is violence and is therefore morally unjustifiable. But when it is used in furtherance of a legitimate cause, it has its moral justification. Elimination of force at all costs is utopian, and the new movement which has arisen in the country and of which we have given a warning is inspired by the ideals which guided Guru Govind Singh and Shivaji, Kamal Pasha and Reza Khan, Washington and Garibaldi, Lafayette, and Lenin.”

Far more interesting is the comprehensive ideal of revolution. The revolutionaries had not only destructive but also constructive ideas. They not only wanted to replace British imperialism with a Republican form of government in India, but they also wanted to place it on a socialistic foundation. This was already indicated by the addition of the word ‘Socialist’ to the original name of the Hindusthan Republican Association.

After narrating how they surrendered of their own accord and were prepared for any penalty, Bhagat and Batukeshwar observed:

“By crushing two insignificant units a nation cannot be crushed. We wanted to emphasize the historical lesson that lettres de cachet and Bastille could not crush the revolutionary movement in France. Gallows and Siberian mines could not extinguish the Russian Revolution. Blood Sundays and Black and Tans failed to strangle the movement of Irish freedom. Can Ordinance and Safety Bills snuff out the flame of freedom in India?”

Another interesting characteristic of the revolutionary movement is a high degree of development in technical skill, as displayed by the preparation of superior types of bombs. This was accompanied by a higher efficiency in military skill and strategy, of which a typical example was the Chittagong Armoury Raid in 1930.

The revolutionary movement, however, did not die out in 1934.

The new constitutional reforms of 1935 took away the edge of both violent and non-violent methods in Indian politics. But the revolutionary spirit, like that of Gandhi’s Satyagraha, was not lost on the people. When Gandhi sought to revive the Civil Disobedience movement in 1942 but was prevented from launching it by his sudden arrest, the revolutionary spirit raised its head, and the cult of non-violence was submerged under that of violence. The widespread but short-lived outbreak of 1942 was the product of an admixture of revolutionary violence and a spirit of non-violent resistance inculcated by Gandhi. The two streams joined together and gave a new form to this, the last battle for India’s freedom fought on Indian soil.

Hindu Mahasabha 

The session of the Hindu Mahasabha at Nagpur in 1938 was largely attended, and a detachment of volunteers was armed with swords and lathis. It passed a resolution demanding universal military training to counteract the Muslim preponderance in the Indian Army and to prepare the way for a full-scale national militia. It would be clear from what has been said above, particularly the result of the election of 1937, that however deplorable the attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha from a national point of view, it had no large following among the Hindus and did not represent the Hindu community in any sense of the term. Besides, it had no chance of carrying its views against those of the Congress, which the Muslims themselves looked upon as a Hindu organization.

If this supposition were true, then logically, the Hindu Mahasabha should not have counted for much in the eyes of the Muslims. But the world is often governed by sentiments rather than logic. There were two special reasons why the Muslims got nervous over the views so frankly expressed by Savarkar. First, he aimed at establishing Hindu Raj in India, a contingency that was a nightmare with the Muslims and never ceased to create the worst fear in their minds. Secondly, the Muslim League was aware of the effect produced by enthusiastic appeals to communal instincts.

The same means by which the Muslim League gained pre-eminence at the expense of Nationalist Muslims and other Muslim organizations might also enable the Hindu Mahasabha to secure predominance in the Hindu community despite the Congress. Suspicion breeds mistrust, and many Muslims thought that several Congressmen probably agreed with Dr. Savarkar. 

The Japanese Reaching India Almost 

The war suddenly took an alarming turn as far as India was concerned with the entry of the Japanese into the war on the side of the Axis powers against Britain. The rapidity with which they seized Singapore (15 February 1942), hitherto regarded as almost impregnable, overran Malaya, and entered Burma raised their prestige as a military power and brought India within the range of actual hostilities.

It was quite clear that the Japanese intended to invade India from the east through Burma and Manipur. No doubt was left on this point by the propaganda through radio that the Japanese were coming to deliver India from the yoke of the British. The Indians had too much knowledge of their own history and of Japan’s treatment of China to believe in Japanese propaganda.

They were not, with probably a few exceptions, pro-Japanese. But they were not drawn closer to the British either. To the old causes of anti-British sentiments, the Japanese invasion added more. In the first place, they could not help but feel that the present predicament was entirely due to the British, who had dragged them into the war against their will. For, it was argued, the Japanese would never have invaded India if she were not a part of the British Empire, and even then, if India had enjoyed Dominion status, she could remain neutral like Eire (Ireland) and not be forced to become a belligerent. The Indians could not help but feel that, in their present state of dependence, they were destined to share only the evils and sorrows of the British Empire and not its benefits and blessings.

Secondly, despite the many shortcomings and evils of British rule, the Indians always balanced them against one inestimable advantage it offered, namely, security from foreign invasions. The fortunes of the war clearly indicated the hollowness of this claim in the immediate, and possibly remote, future. Thirdly, the Japanese victories had considerably lowered British prestige and destroyed the myth of their invincibility. Many had also come to believe that the days of the British Empire were numbered.

Non-Violence Still A Weapon 

As regards the Congress, though the Japanese invasion did not change its attitude, it certainly changed its leadership. Once more, as in June 1940, Gandhi feared that the war conditions would force Britain to offer independence to India on condition of participation in the war, and he rightly felt that most Congressmen would accept it.

The Working Committee of the Congress met at Bardoli on December 23, 1941, and passed a long resolution, a part of which is quoted below:

“The whole background in India is one of hostility and distrust of the British Government, and not even the most far-reaching promises can alter this background, nor can a subject India offer voluntary or willing help to an arrogant imperialism which is indistinguishable from Fascist authoritarianism….“The Committee is therefore of opinion that the resolution of the A.I.C.C., which was passed in Bombay on 16 September, 1940, and defines the Congress policy, holds to-day still.”

By another resolution, the Working Committee relieved Gandhi of the responsibility laid upon him (of leading the Satyagraha movement),

“but the Committee assures him that the policy of non-violence adopted under his guidance for the attainment of Swaraj, and which has proved so successful in leading to mass awakening and otherwise will be adhered to by the Congress.”

The Working Committee issued a series of instructions in anticipation of the Japanese attack.

The general trend of these instructions was to set up the Congress as an independent organization, outside the Government, throughout the country, to help and serve people in any contingency arising out of the threatened Japanese invasion. The net position was that although the Congress shook off the pacifism of Gandhi, it reiterated its old policy of non-cooperation with the war efforts of the government so long as the independence of India was not guaranteed. 

Partition was an Evil Necessity

Azad, Mosley, and many others have condemned both Nehru and Patel on this account and held them up as the real authors of the ill-fated partition of India. But before denouncing Patel or Nehru and describing them as mere dupes of ‘wily Mountbatten’s clever manoeuvring,’ it is only fair to remember that the Congress had unanimously passed resolutions, directly or indirectly conceding Pakistan, in 1934, 1942, 1945, and March 1947. Gandhi and Nehru referred to this contingency as a very possible one. No Congress leader liked the idea, but some had to accept it as an evil necessity, and each might have his own special reason for finally accepting the partition as a concrete proposal.

Jawaharlal Nehru at first reacted violently against the partition but was gradually reconciled to it. Azad suggests that Vallabhbhai Patel and Lord and Lady Mountbatten influenced him. There may be some truth in it, but as regards the reasons that finally induced him to accept it, we have the testimony of Nehru himself, which should outweigh everything else.

Leonard Mosley writes:

“Pandit Nehru told Michael Brecher, his biographer, (in 1956, the reasons for accepting the Partition of India): ‘Well, I suppose it was the compulsion of events and the feeling that we wouldn’t get out of that deadlock or morass by pursuing the way we had done; it became worse and worse. Further a feeling that even if we got freedom for India with that background, it would be very weak India, that is a federal India with far too much power in the federating units. A larger India would have constant troubles, constant disintegrating pulls. And also the fact that we saw no other way of getting our freedom — in the near future I mean. And so we accepted it and said, let us build up a strong India. And if others do not want to be in it, well how can we and why should we force them to be in it?’”

But perhaps Pandit Nehru came nearer the truth in a conversation with Mosley in 1960 when he said,

“The truth is that we were tired men, and we were getting on in years too. Few of us could stand the prospect of going to prison again — and if we had stood out for a united India as we wished it, prison obviously awaited us. We saw the fires burning in Punjab and heard every day of the killings. The plan for partition offered a way out, and we took it.”

He added,

“But if Gandhi had told us not to, we would have gone on fighting and waiting. But we accepted. We expected that partition would be temporary and that Pakistan was bound to come back to us. None of us guessed how much the killing and the crisis in Kashmir would embitter relations.”

When we remember that Nehru looked upon Brecher as his best biographer and frankly confided his inmost personal feelings to Mosley, we may reasonably put a great value on their version of what Nehru himself had said. The two statements, though somewhat different, are not self-contradictory, and perhaps both contain a great deal of truth.

Like Nehru, Gandhi also admitted not only the possibility but almost the inevitability of Pakistan. He wrote in the Harijan in 1942 that if many Muslims want to partition India, they must have the partition, and in 1944 he continued negotiations with Jinnah on this basis. And yet, when the crucial moment for the final decision arrived, he told Azad on March 3, 1947, before he met Mountbatten:

“If the Congress wishes to accept partition, it will be over my dead body. So long as I am alive, I will never agree to the partition of India. Nor will I, if I can help it, allow Congress to accept it.”

According to Azad, a great change came over Gandhi after he interviewed Mountbatten. Gandhi

“no longer spoke so vehemently against it (partition.) and began to repeat the arguments which Sardar Patel had already used. For over two hours I pleaded with him but could make no impression on him.”

According to Rajendra Prasad,

“Mahatmaji feared that the results of that acceptance (of Partition) would be disastrous… But when he realised that those who were entrusted with the responsibility of administration found that it was not possible to carry on and that there must either be partition or open war with the League, he decided to keep quiet and not oppose partition in any way.”

However, the reasons that Gandhi himself gave for his conversion are somewhat different. When opposition to the acceptance of partition was running very high in the meeting of the A.I.C.C. on June 14, Gandhi spoke for about 40 minutes, urging the acceptance of partition. His main argument was that if the A.I.C.C. threw out the recommendations of the Working Committee, they must find a new set of leaders who could not only constitute the Congress Working Committee but also take charge of the government. As it was impossible to replace the old and tried leaders, he would advise the House to accept the resolution.

Gandhi thus threw his whole weight in favour of the partition. Gandhi concluded by saying that he was one of those who had steadfastly opposed the partition of India, but sometimes certain decisions, however unpalatable they might be, had to be taken. The first part of the last sentence cannot be accepted as quite accurate in view of his statement and activities in 1942 and 1944, just mentioned above, and it is difficult to reconcile the main trend of his speech with Nehru’s statement that if Gandhi had said ‘no’ to Pakistan, the Congress leaders would have all stood by him.

Mountbatten very effectively used one strong argument in favour of the partition of India to win over the Congress leaders. In all the plans discussed so far, there was one point in common, namely, that there should be a weak centre with very limited authority, while the residuary powers should be vested in the Provinces. This was a concession to the Muslims, who were apprehensive of the Hindu majority in the center. In a country like India, with diverse languages, races, religions, and people in different stages of political and cultural evolution and with different historical traditions, a strong central authority was needed to keep down the fissiparous tendency, which has been a permanent feature of Indian politics since the beginning of recorded history.

The separation of Muslim Provinces would give the rest of India the opportunity to evolve a constitution with a strong central government. So, Pakistan would not be an unmixed curse. What it would take away in quantity would be compensated by the solidarity it would give to the rest. What idealism would suffer; real politics would gain. This argument must have deeply impressed the Congress leaders after their recent experience of the joint Hindu-Muslim administration in the Viceroy’s Executive Council, writes Mazumdar.

The previous parts of this series can be found at the following links:

History Of Freedom Movement: The View Of R.C. Mazumdar – Part 1

Excerpts From History Of The Freedom Movement in India By R.C. Mazumdar – The Politics Of The Book – Part 2

Excerpts From History Of The Freedom Movement In India By R. C. Mazumdar – The Muslim Politics – Part 3

Excerpts From History Of The Freedom Movement In India By R. C. Mazumdar – The Ruthless English: Attitudes, Second World War, Churchill, and Mountbatten – Part 4

Excerpts From History Of The Freedom Movement In India By R. C. Mazumdar – Criticism Of Gandhi – Part 5