Gandhi In South Africa 

Mazumdar shows how the Gandhi years in South Africa were a partial success. Indians were hardly in a better position after Gandhi left the country. The Satyagraha campaign led by Gandhi in South Africa resulted in the Gandhi-Smuts settlement of 1914 and the Indian Relief Act. Though Gandhi hailed it as the “Magna Charta of our liberty” in South Africa, less idealistic people held that it “was not in fact so great a victory for the Indians as it appeared at first sight.”
Two things are quite clear, says Mazumdar. Firstly, Smuts gained his main objective, which was to terminate Indian immigration into South Africa; and secondly, Gandhi’s hope that “my countrymen will have comparative peace and South Africa shall hear little of the Indian problem in an acute form” was completely belied. The position of the Indians in South Africa “is more unsatisfactory in theory and practice today than it was at the turn of the century,” one said.

The Reciprocity Resolution passed in 1918 affirmed the right of each country in the British Empire to regulate the composition of its population by imposing restrictions on immigration. This was clearly a political immaturity, or lack of diplomatic wisdom, of the Indians, says Mazumdar. This was hardly a great victory in their fight for equality. While conceding equal rights to all the British dominions, it practically meant submission to the policy of restricting the immigration of Indians into South Africa and other parts of the empire. India, having no such settlers from other dominions, could do nothing to oppose it by way of reciprocal actions.

“The ink with which the Reciprocity Resolution was written was hardly dry before the South African Whites renewed their campaign against Indian settlers.”

The Asiatic Land and Trading (Amendment) Act of 1919, passed by the Transvaal Government, prohibited Indians from owning fixed property anywhere in the Transvaal, either directly or indirectly, and curtailed their trading rights in the mining areas. The South African League extended this by declaring in their conference in 1920 that

“South Africa is not prepared to take the first steps in national suicide by admitting Indians to free and indiscriminate residence amongst white people.”

This was merely the beginning of a series of anti-Indian Legislations.

Smuts, who now championed the anti-Indian campaign, publicly declared:

“The whole basis of our particular system in South Africa rests on inequality. It is the bedrock of our constitution.”

Thus, Smuts, who had expressed his sympathy for Indians when they fought to defend the British Empire, now appeared in his true colour. In violation of his agreement with Gandhi in 1914, the Asiatic Land and Trading (Amendment) Act of 1919 was put into operation. The government introduced the Class Areas Bill in the Union Assembly in 1924, giving effect to the policy of commercial and residential segregation of Indians throughout the Union. The Bill lapsed as the party of Smuts was defeated at the General Election. But General Hertzog, the new Premier, introduced the Colour Bar Bill, which prohibited the employment of Asiatics and natives in mines and industrial works. This Bill was too much even for Smuts, and though the Union Assembly passed it, the Senate, where Smuts commanded a majority, rejected it.

Hertzog then introduced the Areas Reservation and Immigration and Registration Bill on July 23, 1925. It was based on the same principles of segregation as the Class Areas Bill of Smuts’ Government, but much wider in scope. This bill provided that:

(1) the Indians shall be permitted to buy and sell land and carry on trade only in areas to be set apart in towns and cities and nowhere else; and
(2) the Governor-General may proclaim that no Indian shall buy or lease land more than 30 miles away from the coastline, except from an Indian within those 30 miles.

Gandhi returned from South Africa in 1915, just when the First World War started. He sailed back via England to a thumping reception in Bombay.

Gandhi’s Contribution in 1920–1921: The Non-Cooperation Movement

Gandhi launched the non-cooperation movement, which was the first mass-scale political campaign, on September 4, 1920. The reasons for this were many:

• withdrawing support for British reforms following the Rowlatt Act (March 1919);
• a political awakening by Indians against the Jallianwala Bagh massacre (April 13, 1919).
• boycotting British goods and promoting Swadeshi,
• supported the Khilafat agitation (1919–1922), which called for the reinstatement of the Caliph of Turkey;
• and an end to untouchability.

The movement suddenly stopped on February 4, 1922, on Gandhi’s call after the Chauri Chaura incident.

Mazumdar writes that the most outstanding feature of the non-cooperation movement was the willingness and ability of the people in general to endure, to a remarkable degree, hardships and punishments inflicted by the government. This is the reason why, though the non-cooperation movement collapsed, the memory of its greatness survived and was destined to inspire the nation to launch it again later. The movement inspired people with a new confidence in their power to fight for freedom.

Two undeniable facts strike anyone who reviews the whole course of events during the movement, writes Mazumdar:

“First, the Congress had, for the first time, become a mass movement in the sense that national awakening had not only penetrated to the people at large but also made them active participants in the struggle for freedom.
The second, which is no less important, but generally ignored at the time, is that the Indian National Congress was, almost overnight, turned into a genuine revolutionary organization. It was no longer a deliberative assembly but an organized fighting force, pledged to revolution. Its weapons were different, but its aims, objects, and temperament closely resembled those of militant nationalism.”

But there were differences too. Unlike militant nationalism, the Congress did not work in secret, and its non-violent creed and method had the full sympathy and active support of the people at large. These two features were the greatest contributions of Gandhi to India’s struggle for freedom.

When the Afghans Planned to Attack India (1919)

The Third Anglo-Afghan War began on May 6, 1919, when the Emirate of Afghanistan invaded British India, and ended with a truce on August 8, 1919. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919 resulted in the Afghans gaining control of foreign affairs from Britain and the British recognizing the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and British India.

On May 11, the Pioneer challenged Muhammad Ali to say whether, directly or indirectly, he was not in communication with the Amir of Afghanistan about the invasion. Muhammad Ali gave an evasive reply.

“I am a Muslim first and everything else afterward.”

“This Afghan hare is none of my starting. I do not remember having said anything about any foreign invasion of India for more than a year.”

However, in the Allahabad District Conference held on May 11, 1921, he stated:

“they wanted to win Swaraj but not with the aid of a foreign power. If any such waged war against the present Government for the purpose of making India free, they would not render any help to Government but would simply watch the fight and take no part in it because they did not believe in violence.”

He added, however, that there was no correspondence between him and the Amir. 

Gandhi also took a very curious view on this matter. Not only did he advise the Amir not to enter any treaty with the British Government, but also declared:

“I would, in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he waged war against the British Government. That is to say, I would openly tell my countrymen that it would be a crime to help a government that had lost the confidence of the nation to remain in power.”

Gandhi further stated that the non-co-operators were not to help the government in any case.

“I would rather see India perish at the hands of Afghans,” said he, “than purchase freedom from Afghan invasion at the cost of her honour. To have India defended by an unrepentant Government that keeps the Khilafat and Punjab wounds still bleeding, is to sell India’s honour.”

Many resented this attitude. C. F. Andrews was afraid that Gandhi was unwittingly supporting pan-Islamism. Lajpat Rai wrote three articles in his paper Bande Mataram, strongly condemning the attitude that the Moslems should join the Afghan invader in case a Jihad was declared. B. C. Pal strongly attacked Gandhi in the columns of The Englishman. 

The Civil Disobedience Movement, 1930

The second mass movement of Gandhi was the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930, and it started with his famous Dandi march. It aimed to abolish the salt tax and boycott the all-British Simon Commission of 1928, which recommended constitutional reforms. On January 26, 1930, the Congress declared Purna Swaraj, or total self-rule. The fight against the repressive measures resulted in more repressive and harsher measures from the British government against the people of India.

Amongst the various activities were processions, public meetings, and conferences despite bans; boycotting of British goods; issuing unauthorized bulletins; saluting the national flag in public; and manufacturing salt. There was the celebration of National Week (April 6–13) and the holding of the Annual Session of the Congress in Delhi despite the police ban and the strictest surveillance. Civil Resisters made no physical resistance, even when arrested or mercilessly beaten, and did not defend themselves in court even against false accusations, for they took no part in any judicial trial.

Mazumdar writes that the British rule in India sank to the level of mediaeval tyrannies whose annals of brutality fill the mind of a modern reader with an unspeakable horror and whose modern parallel is only in the Communist and Fascist rule in Europe. An English delegation carried a report on the Civil Disobedience Movement. Bertrand Russell writes in the preface to the Report of the Delegation:

“There has been no lack of interest in the misdeeds of the Nazis in Germany; they have been fully reported in the Press and have been commented on with self-righteous indignation. Few people in England realise that misdeeds quite as serious are being perpetrated by the British in India.”

The Report describes, as follows, the general nature of the Disobedience campaign:

“Civil Disobedience is often spoken of as lawlessness. Inasmuch as it is defiance of existing law it is lawless. But it would be a gross misrepresentation to describe the Civil Disobedience campaign as a movement that lets loose lawless people in society; a campaign in which everybody was asked to do as they pleased. Still more would it be grotesque to describe it as an encouragement to violence, crime, or licence. Civil resisters do not go about breaking laws as they please, nor interfering with the liberty of others. Civil Disobedience is a form of direct action against the Government of the day. Its moral basis is that law in India is not based on consent; its administration is under alien direction; and its ends are not determined by Indian wills or purposes. Civil Disobedience thus becomes both a moral protest and weapon of attack on the present system of administration.”

“We had not understood what the expression Police Raj, which we have heard used so often, meant till we came to India and saw it in action. The Police are a law unto themselves. Petty officials exercise very wide powers that are freely used. The statement that in India ‘the police beat first and inquire afterwards’ is only partially true to-day, as there is no necessity for any inquiry. The Ordinances have destroyed every safeguard against police oppression, which obtains all over India and is by no means confined to the ill-paid ranks of the Force. Police methods are cruel and vindictive. Men are beaten inside lockups; brutal force is used in ‘dispersing’ resisters (often only one, as in the case of picketing), undertrials are starved in lock-ups; and property is appropriated or destroyed. Vulgar abuse and the infliction of humiliation and violent assault are pretty common. It is difficult to understand why force should be used at all in effecting arrest of civil resisters, as it is admitted that they neither resist nor evade arrest. In any case, beating-up or lathi charges, or kicks and bullying preliminary to, or instead of, arrest, is a wanton piece of brutality. One explanation given to us was that such methods were more effective and cheaper than arrests. The explanation carries with it its own condemnation. Another gross abuse that appeared to be widely prevalent was the practice of allowing the police to buy, directly, goods that had been attached or confiscated.”

The End of Civil Disobedience

Mazumdar writes that while the Civil Disobedience movement was continuing in full force despite the unabated fury of government repression and the imprisonment of almost all notable Congress leaders together with nearly ninety thousand followers, Gandhi suddenly sidetracked the whole campaign by raising a side issue. The Congressmen continued their fight with grim determination, but Gandhi had no heart for the Civil Disobedience movement, and the anti-untouchability campaign fully occupied his mind.

Thus, the great Civil Disobedience campaign came to an ignoble end, despite all the brave and heroic deeds of which any nation may well feel proud. On the eve of his famous march to Dandi, which started the campaign, Gandhi had said:

“Civil Disobedience, once begun this time, cannot be stopped and must not be stopped so long as there is a single civil resister left free or alive.”

Mazumdar writes,

“What puzzled the Indians most was the leader’s order to lay down arms and surrender even before the soldiers had abandoned the grim struggle. Gandhi had practically given up the fight for freedom on 18 August 1932.”

Madan Mohan Malaviya made a public statement on May 2, 1932, that gave a report of the then-situation:

“During these four months up to April 20th last, according to the reports published in the press, 66,646 persons, among whom were included 5,325 women and many children, have been arrested, imprisoned, and humiliated. This could not possibly include arrests in the far-off villages in the interior of the country and, therefore, the Congress estimates the total arrests to be over 80,000 up to that date. The jails are overcrowded, and ordinary prisoners are being released before their time to make room for political prisoners. To this has to be added the number of arrests made during the last ten days, including those of the delegates to the Delhi Congress. According to the reports in the press firing has been resorted to in at least 29 cases with considerable loss of life. There have been lathi charges against unarmed crowds at 325 places. There have been 633 cases of house searches and 102 cases of confiscation of property. A general policy has been pursued of imposing extraordinarily heavy fines on persons who have been convicted in connection with the movement and property far in excess of what was necessary for realising the amount of fines has been attached and sold. The Press has been gagged as it has never been gagged before. 163 cases have been reported where the newspapers and the public presses have been regulated by orders for confiscation, demands for security, and consequent closing down of the presses, warnings, searches, and arrests of editors, printers, or keepers. Numerous public meetings and processions of non-violent men and women have been dispersed by lathi charges and sometimes by firing.”

Slowly and silently, the movement faded away. During the upheaval caused by the great earthquake in Bihar on January 16, 1934, it passed away unnoticed into the limbo of oblivion. The tempo of the Civil Disobedience movement continued for one year, as more evident from the address of the President as quoted above.

Mazumdar writes,

“And yet Gandhi cried halt just at this psychological moment, as he did in 1922.” 

The Aftermath of the Collapse of the Civil Disobedience Movement

A conference held in Delhi on March 31, 1934, resolved that the All-India Swarajya Party needed revival. Gandhi not only welcomed the revival of the Swarajya party and its decision to fight the forthcoming elections but also felt that it was

“not only the right but the duty of every Congressman who believed in its utility to do so.”

The decision of 1920 to boycott the Council was reversed in 1923, reaffirmed in 1929, and again reversed in 1934.

The Indian National Congress thus slid back into the position it had renounced because of the non-cooperation movement in 1920. The Working Committee, in accordance with the resolutions of the AICC, called upon all Congressmen to give up Civil Disobedience, and there was an official termination of the movement on May 20, 1934. The Government of India, being satisfied that the Civil Disobedience movement was dead, lifted the ban on the Congress organizations, except in Bengal and N.W.F.P., on June 12 and announced a general policy of expediting the release of the Civil Disobedience prisoners. 

Gandhi-Irwin Pact: Nehru Forced to Accept

Gandhi and Lord Irwin had eight meetings that totalled 24 hours. The Gandhi-Irwin Pact was a political agreement signed by Gandhi and Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India, on March 5, 1931, before the Second Round Table Conference in London. There was a vague offer of ‘dominion status’ for India by the Viceroy in 1929 in an unspecified future. There was also a proposal for a Round Table Conference to discuss a future constitution.

The Second Round Table Conference was held from September to December 1931 in London. This marked the end of the Civil Disobedience Movement in India. The government agreed to withdraw all ordinances and end prosecutions, release all political prisoners not guilty of violence, permit peaceful picketing, allow the manufacture of salt by people near the seacoast, and lift the ban on the Congress.

Mazumdar writes that it is a moot point to decide why Gandhi made such a volte-face. The only rational justification is a realisation on his part that in this unequal fight with the government, the chances of success were remote, and a compromise in good time is preferable to an admission of failure and forced retreat. But whatever the real grounds for Gandhi’s retreat, one ignored aspect must be a valuable long-term gain. For the first time in the history of British India, the British Government condescended to treat the Indian National Congress on a footing of equality as a political opponent and entered a prolonged negotiation with its accredited agent to settle terms of peace.

The pact put the Indian National Congress on a high pedestal and increased its prestige and stature. More importantly, the British conceded to the Congress the authority to speak for political India in the future too. British statesmen like Churchill fully realized that they had yielded ground.
Mazumdar writes,

“The very fact that Gandhi, ‘the half-naked fakir,’— to use Churchill’s expression — ascended the staircase of the Viceregal Lodge, day after day, to continue diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the Congress, made it patent to all that henceforth the British rule in India must take due cognizance of the great national organization which was fighting for India’s freedom.”

The Civil Disobedience Movement came to an end without achieving freedom but had great importance in India’s struggle. It demonstrated the awakening of political consciousness among the masses and their ardour and ability to take an active part in the struggle for freedom, to a degree undreamt of before, either by the friends or foes of India. It also gave evidence of the high moral inspiration and unflinching courage infused among the people by Gandhi. 

Gandhi and His Non-Intervention in the Bhagat Singh Execution (March 23, 1931). Bose Revolts.

The resolution of the Congress endorsing the Gandhi-Irwin Pact is a curious example of self-delusion and an attempt to mislead the people. The Pact lays down the acceptance of British control over such matters as defence, external affairs, the financial credit of India, etc. Yet, according to the resolution of the Karachi Congress, while endorsing the Pact, “the Congress desires to make it clear that the Congress goal of Purna Swaraj remains intact.” Though asked by Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru at first refused to move the resolution in the open session of the Congress. It went against his grain, he said. But at the last moment, he decided to sponsor it.

The younger section, though disapproving of the Pact, did not oppose it in the plenary session of the Congress. But the sullen resentment of the youths found expression in other ways, particularly over the news of the execution of the three youths, Bhagat Singh, Raj Guru, and Sukh Dev, convicted in the Lahore Conspiracy Case. Bhagat Singh was the founder of the Youth movement in Punjab, and, according to the official history of the Congress, “at that moment, Bhagat Singh’s name was as widely known all over India and was as popular as Gandhi’s.” Gandhi was pressurised to intercede with the Viceroy for the commutation of their capital punishment. Mazumdar writes that Gandhi probably did his best, but the utmost that he could get from the Viceroy was an assurance to postpone the execution and reconsider the matter.

This led the public, including Gandhi, to believe that there would be a cancellation. But on March 23, only a few days before the Karachi Congress session (March 26 to March 31, 1931), the British executed Bhagat Singh and his two comrades. The news filled the whole country with grief and cast a gloom over the whole Congress camp. The President cancelled the usual festivities on the opening day of Congress.

The younger section, however, was under the impression that Gandhi did not press the matter upon the Viceroy’s attention sufficiently strongly, and Subhas Chandra Bose had suggested to him that he should, if necessary, break with the Viceroy on the question. But Gandhi, averse on principle to revolutionary activities, did not go so far. The younger section, therefore, held Gandhi in a way responsible for the death of Bhagat Singh, and when Gandhi, along with the President-elect Vallabhabhai Patel, alighted from the Railway train at a minor station, twelve miles from Karachi, a hostile demonstration met them, and several young men offered black flowers and black garlands. 

The Second Round Table Conference in London: A Failure for Gandhi (September to December 1931) 

One British person commented,

“The Conference, instead of breaking up in disorder with 100 percent of Hindu political India against us, ended in promises of cooperation by 99 percent of the Conference, including even such people as Malaviya, while Gandhi himself was indisposed to join the Standing Committee. The Muslims have become firm allies of the Europeans. They are very satisfied with their own position and are prepared to work with us.”

The failure of Gandhi to achieve any success brings out in relief the inconsistency and unwisdom of the Congress in refusing to attend the first (November 1930–January 1931) and accepting the invitation to the second Round Table Conference. The conditions under which Congress agreed to attend the second Round Table Conference could have been the same as the first. By joining it from the very beginning with sufficient strength, the Congress could influence its outlook and general approach.

As it is, Gandhi confronted a communalist structure, allowing him to grow up freely without hindrance. Besides, with Irwin as Viceroy and the Labour Party in power, there was a far greater chance of gaining substantial reforms than in the second Conference, when Lord Willingdon was the Viceroy and the Conservatives had come into power. The failure was mainly due to the lack of harmony among Indian delegates and the obstinate reluctance of the Conservatives to part with real power in India. 

Mazumdar writes:

“But the tactics, or lack of tactics, on the part of Gandhi was also responsible for it to a large extent. The saint had no place in a meeting of die-hard politicians. Gandhi’s idealism made no impression on them, his frank gesture for peace and cooperation at any price was taken as a sign of weakness, his lack of diplomacy in putting all his cards on the table was fully exploited by the astute British politicians, and the measure they made of his power and ability by actual contact was far lower than their previous estimate based on reports of his leadership in India.”

Gandhi had realized from the very beginning that the importance of the Indian National Congress, which he represented, was deliberately minimal, if not totally ignored, and that its treatment was merely one of many parties represented at the conference.

Mazumdar scathingly writes:

“Gandhi’s Christian meekness and humility fell flat on the followers of Christ, who only understood the language of strength or force.”

His conduct at the conference added one more illustration of his utter inability to continue negotiations with trained politicians. 

The Third Round Table Meeting (November–December 1932) 

It seems to be, however, clear that the Burmans (Myanmar was then Burma) were not opposed to separation; what they were afraid of was the possibility of the perpetuation of British domination if they were separated from India without the clear promise of self-government for Burma. The British Government, however, was keen on separating Burma from India, and the Conference ultimately decided upon the separation.

1940 Civil Disobedience of Gandhi

The Congress decided to start the Civil Disobedience campaign, as contemplated in the resolution adopted at the Ramgarh Congress, under the leadership of Gandhi. But, curiously enough, Gandhi chose the issue to be not the independence of India but the right to preach openly against the war, and it was to be an individual (later changed to a small group) and not a mass Satyagraha. It started on October 17, 1940, and as soon as an individual (or a small group) was arrested, another took his place, until the prisoners numbered six hundred. However it created little enthusiasm and less interest, and Gandhi suspended it on December 17, 1940.

It was resumed on January 5, 1941, and more than 20,000 were convicted. This barren policy was severely criticised by many and seems to be due to the unwillingness on the part of Gandhi and Nehru to embarrass the British Government and, at the same time, a desire to take the wind out of the sails of Subhas Bose’s Party (Forward Bloc), which had begun its campaign of Civil Disobedience in right earnest.

Even the repeated rebuffs of the British Government to the Congress had not modified in any way the attitude of Gandhi and Nehru towards the British.
On May 20, 1940, Nehru said:

“Launching a Civil Disobedience campaign at a time when Britain is engaged in a life and death struggle would be an act derogatory to India’s honour.”

Similarly, Gandhi said,

“We do not seek our independence out of Britain’s ruin. That is not the way of non-violence.”

Gandhi probably thought that by following a mild policy, he would ultimately secure valuable concessions from the government, but he was disappointed.

Gandhi After the Collapse of the Cripps Proposal (1942)

Since the collapse of the Civil Disobedience of 1930, Gandhi had abandoned the idea of mass movement. But, as Azad put it, his “mind was now moving from the extreme of complete inactivity to that of organized mass effort.”
On June 7, Gandhi wrote,

“I waited and waited until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait. If I continue to wait, I might have to wait till doomsday. For the preparation that I have prayed and worked for may never come, and in the meantime, I may be enveloped and overwhelmed by the flames that threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the people to resist the slavery.”

Gandhi is also reported to have said,

“I have not asked the British to hand over India to the Congress or to the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs, or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos.”

Gandhi’s changed attitude towards Britain also brought about a change in his method of activity.

Nehru on Gandhi 

One might well ponder how and why a dynamic personality like Jawaharlal Nehru made an abject surrender to Gandhi?

Nehru himself said about Gandhi that:

“ideologically he was sometimes amazingly backward…much that he says seems to fit in with a medieval Christian saint and not at all with modern psychological experience and method.”

Fortunately, Nehru has himself answered this question, on behalf of himself and many others who were insensibly drawn within the magnetic circle of Gandhi:

“How came we to associate ourselves with Gandhiji politically and to become, in many instances, his devoted followers? The question is hard to answer. Personality is an indefinable thing, a strange force that has power over the souls of men, and he possesses this in ample measure. He attracted people. They did not agree with his philosophy of life, or even with many of his ideals. Often, they did not understand him. But the action that he proposed was something tangible.”

The previous parts can be found at the following links:

History Of Freedom Movement: The View Of R.C. Mazumdar – Part 1

Excerpts From History Of The Freedom Movement in India By R.C. Mazumdar – The Politics Of The Book – Part 2

Excerpts From History Of The Freedom Movement In India By R. C. Mazumdar – The Muslim Politics – Part 3

Excerpts From History Of The Freedom Movement In India By R. C. Mazumdar – The Ruthless English: Attitudes, Second World War, Churchill, and Mountbatten – Part 4