Disclaimer: This piece by Dr. Pingali Gopal is with permission from Chittaranjan Naik.  The article is a summary of a five-part article written by Chittaranjan Naik on an online forum for discussing Advaita. The ideas and the themes solely belong to the latter. Dr. Pingali Gopal claims no expertise or primary scholarship in the subject matter. The purpose of the article is to hopefully stimulate the readers to explore further. One can access the full article here:

APAURUSHEYATVA OF THE VEDAS BY CHITTARANJAN NAIK

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Continued from Part 1

VEDANTA – SAMANVAYA AND AVIRODHA

Much of the confusion that prevails in contemporary discussions on Vedanta arises from ignoring this two-fold dimension (pravritti and nivritti) for the Supreme Knowledge. Consequently, it has become common practice for participants in a debate to ask for the truths of the Vedas through arguments and proofs. But the pramana called Veda does not exist to show the proof to one who has no capacity to see the truth. The sun shines by its own nature and reveals the world in its sunlight. It is not the deficiency of the sun or of the sunlight if a blind man cannot see the world. That is why, in contradistinction to the buddhi (intellect) of an ordinary man, the intellect of an adhikaari for knowledge is ‘shuddha buddhi’ (pure intellect). It is for such a person that the Veda serves as a pramana to reveal the Supreme Truth. 

The Vedas are pramanas for two categories of people: (i) the adhikaaris who have attained the four qualifications, and (ii) those who walk in the path of Vedic pravritti dharma where they discipline the mind. Adhikaara are qualifications that pertain to the inner constitution of the soul. Secondly, adhikaara is not something that always surfaces as an irruption at a single point in time. For one who has led perfect lives in many births, it may suddenly irrupt with all the four qualifications manifested to the fullest degree. Such a man is an uttama-adhikaari and he needs to hear the Mahavakya only once to see the meanings of the Vedic sentences. But for many other adhikaaris, the four qualifications may manifest to varying degrees and such people would need to strive hard. This striving to see the meaning of the Vedas (Vedartha) is a process of reconciliation of the diverse Vedic sentences to reveal that Single Vision in which they fall in place effortlessly. Such a reconciliation of Vedic sentences is Samanvaya.

Samanvaya is meant for the adhikaaris and for those people who study the Vedas as part of their duties. It finds its place in a debate (vada) only between two opponents both of whom abide by the common tenet that the Veda is pramana. But when the debate is between two opponents wherein one of them does not believe the Veda to be pramana, then the debate does not take the form of Samanvaya, but takes the form of Avirodha. The latter is tarka (discussion) to ensure that there is no virodha (opposition) to the vision obtained by samanvaya (reconciliation). There is no attempt in such debates to demonstrate the truth of the Vedas to the opponents.  

TRADITIONAL INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ARE DARSHANAS, NOT SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHIES

Modern authors writing on Indian Philosophy often refer to it as ‘speculative philosophy’. Unlike in science, wherein the scientific proposition has a criterion of physical verifiability, philosophy in the West had a different criterion. It is for this reason that philosophy earned a notoriously bad name in the early years of the twentieth century when the entire field of metaphysics became ‘nonsense’.  The ‘attack’ against philosophy came from the ‘Analytical Philosophers’. The propositions are factually meaningful only if they are empirically verifiable or if they derive out of terms already defined (tautologous). Hence, in the absence of both, metaphysical statements are meaningless. Since metaphysics, philosophy, ethics, religion, and aesthetics are all of this nature, the only task that remains for philosophy is that of clarification and analysis. They concluded that the propositions of philosophy are linguistic, not factual, and philosophy was a department of logic. Based on such assertions, Analytical Philosophy sought to sweep aside two millennia of lofty human thought into the dustbin of ‘emotive thinking’. 

It is not hard to see where this line of thinking comes from. Western philosophy had failed to provide a sound basis for epistemology. Unlike the Indian Darshanas, most of the Western philosophy was largely speculative in origin and the propositions of philosophy were often grand edifices built on the caprices of thought. Western philosophy became a complex maze of verbiage that ultimately led to the discrediting of everything metaphysical – and of philosophy herself.  

In traditional Indian Philosophy, assertions about the objects of the world are grounded either in perception or in inference. Hence, there is no scope for these assertions to stray into speculative thought. If they do stray, it is only due to the incorrect application of the pramanas and not due to the nature of the philosophy itself. And when it comes to assertions about things that lie beyond the range of the senses, the assertions are grounded in Scriptural sentences and in inferences that depend entirely on these scriptural sentences. If they do stray here too, it is again due to an incorrect understanding of the scriptural sentences or the inferences drawn from them. There is a lot of misconception about Indian Philosophy that comes from modern authors, both Indian as well as Western. 

Traditional Indian Philosophies are Darshanas.  A darshana is not something derived from basic principles to finally arrive at a conclusion. A Darshana is a Single Vision in which all its elements including epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, the practice, and the fruits of sadhana are like various organs that form a single integral whole. Each of the traditional philosophies or darshanas is eternal and is part of the Vedic structure. That is why they constitute one of the fourteen branches of learning (vidhyasthanas) known as Chaturdasa Vidyas.    

THE PRAMANAS AND THE NATURE OF THE PRAMEYAS

All traditional darshanas begin with an explanation of the pramanas. A pramana is a means of obtaining knowledge about an object. There are three basic pramanas in traditional Indian Philosophies. They are Agama (Scripture), pratyaksha (perception), and anumana (inference). The object known by means of a pramana is the prameya. The knowledge of the object is prama. Knowledge of an object is not a distinct entity that stands between the subject and the object but a qualification of the subject, the knower. 

Now, there is a distinct mark of the prameya, or object, in traditional Indian philosophies that is missing in Science and Western philosophy. This mark is the mark of ‘being seen’ or the mark of ‘knowableness’. This point is so vital that if we fail to recognize it, it is likely to lead us into such a position that we would not be speaking Indian Philosophy at all. The mark of ‘being seen’ is a mark of prakriti. In Purva Mimamsa, Uttara Mimamsa (Vedanta), Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, and Yoga, the prameya is ‘the seen’ as distinct from the seer.  In Navya-Nyaya, after defining the seven kinds of padarthas (word-objects) – substance, quality, action, universal, particular, inherence, and non-existence – it states that the common feature of all these seven categories is ‘knowableness’. This feature of objects being ‘the seen’ finds expression in the philosophical tenet that there is a contact between the seer and the seen object- sannikrishna.  The form that the (reflected) consciousness of the seer assumes in seeing the object is ‘vritti’. Thus, the entire world, directly seen ‘as it is’ has no extraneous mediating factor between the seer and the seen. 

What is the ‘nature of the world’ as it appears through the theories of science? First of all, there is no distinct thing in science called ‘the seer’. Secondly, science postulates an elaborate mechanism by which perceptions of objects occur. Accordingly, signals from the object arrive at the sensory organs of the body, these signals then transform into electro-neural signals which various sensory channels carry by to the brain, and then there is the processing of signals to present outputs in the form of images of the objects in the world. Thus, by the very nature of this postulated mechanism, the things seen are of the nature of images and are not the objects themselves. 

We have no means by which we may verify that these images actually possess the same forms as the forms of objects in the world. In other words, every attempt to see them brings to us images rather than the object as it is. Therefore, the theory presents a host of conundrums if we should insist that the images, we see, are the real objects that exist in the world. Therefore, those who hold on to such a belief, i.e., the belief that what we see is the real world, are Naïve Realists. And the philosophy that holds the perceived world to be the real world is ‘Naïve Realism’. 

Then there are those philosophers who, instead of asking the question, ‘By what means may we know that the images we see have actual likenesses to real objects in the world?’, ask the question, ‘By what means may we know that there are objects in the world at all?’ And they conclude that these images are nothing more than productions of the mind, mere ideas, or ideations of the mind. The crux of their arguments is that there can be no means to know whether there are real objects in the world given that the things we experience arise in our minds and are contained in the mind. This is a philosophical position termed as ‘Idealism’. 

There are many variants of idealism, from the kind of Idealism first proposed in the West by Berkeley to the later variants known as Phenomenology and Existentialism, but they all fit into the broad category called ‘Idealism’ as they hold the world to be born out of subjective ideations and belief systems. The terms ‘Naïve Realism’ and ‘Idealism’ are fine when used to refer to certain philosophies of the West. But it is amusing to see many contemporary writers labeling Nyaya as a kind of ‘Naïve Realism’ or ‘Advaita’ as a kind of ‘Idealism’. Sri Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan, in his book ‘History of Indian Philosophy’, paints a picture of Advaita as a kind of Idealism. So does Dasgupta in his History of Indian Philosophies. And as far as the scholars of the West are concerned, it has become more a rule than an exception for viewing Advaita through the lens of Idealism. Similarly, many scholars of the West who write books on Nyaya say that Nyaya’s conception of the world is that of ‘Naïve Realism’. 

Advaita is not Idealism because it negates both the mind and the world. And it says at the same time, the mind and the world are different.  Advaita does not negate only the world and leaves aside the mind to say that the world is ‘mind’. There are twenty-four tattvas defined in Vedanta and only four of them are internal-instruments (antah-karanas comprising ego, chitta, intellect, and mind) whereas the rest are external objects. The attributes of the internal instruments cannot transfer to the objects of the world. The world is not ‘mind’. The objects of the mind, i.e., ideas and thought, have the characteristic of being determined by the individual’s will whereas the objects of the world do not have the characteristic of being so determined. One cannot cook food by merely thinking about the food. In Advaita, the relations between words and objects are eternal, and each word denotes a specific kind of object with specific attributes. Without understanding this basic tenet of Advaita, it is wrong on the part of those authors to label Advaita as Idealism and thereby confuse the world by writing books on the subject. 

And with regards to those scholars who term Nyaya as Naïve Realism, the entire dichotomy between ‘images seen in perception’ and ‘unknowable objects out there in the world’ is a creation of an illogical and incoherent hypothesis that perception takes place through the mediating mechanism of the sensory network and the brain. The notion of Naïve Realism is a caricature of reality that has no bearing on Nyaya or Vedanta. The Nyaya (and Vedanta) theory of perception is based on the principle of contact between the subject and object in which there is no chance of the reality of the world becoming ‘naïve’. Nor is there in them a chance of the world becoming something else than the seen. Therefore, the application of the term ‘Naïve Realism’ to Nyaya betrays a lack of knowledge of Nyaya. 

According to traditional Indian philosophies, the object known through a pramana is neither a mere presentation of something else that may be the real object (as in science) nor is it reducible to something lesser than what it presents itself to be (such as a mere idea of the mind). An object is that which stands to consciousness in the cognitive act of perception.  The world in Indian Philosophy is not the world of Naïve Realism nor is it the ideated world of Idealism. If we must find a name for it, it may be the world of Direct Realism – a world as it presents itself directly to Consciousness.   

THE LOST ARK OF THE CATEGORIES

According to Nyaya Shastra, the prameyas, or objects of knowledge, are of seven kinds. These are dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (action), samanya (universal), vishesha (particular), samavaya (inherence), and abhava (non-existence).  A study of scholastic philosophy included a study of such objects. But today, both in the East and in the West, there is an effacement of such ideas. Vedanta accepts the categories of Nyaya except for the category called ‘inherence’. 

Scientists have discarded the idea of ‘substance’ after looking for it for many decades. However, one cannot find ‘substance’ even after looking for it for a million years. It appears in the original moment of cognition by an apperception that recognizes substance as the grounding factor of the objects we perceive in the world. Substance, in its capacity as pure substance, is never naked without attributes. And neither do we perceive attributes merely. That ‘something’ which the attributes describe (as the nature of the existing thing) is substance. The intrinsic characteristic of a substance is ‘existence’.  And because a substance is an existing thing with various attributes, it is a unity that binds these various attributes into one single unitary existing thing.

The case with universals is similar. One cannot find universals by looking for them. Anything one can look at, think of, or conceive is a ‘particular’. Universals do not exist in the world. They do not exist in thought. They are not spatio-temporal things. Universals are meanings that exist in the Self and which form the basis of sakshi-pramana in the act of recognition (pratyabhijna). In the West, there has been a two-thousand-year war between the Realists (Platonists) and the Nominalists over the question of the existence of universals. Thaeatetus of Plato answers it – universals are ‘stamps of truth in Being’. The ‘ideal red’ or the ‘ideal circle’ of Plato is not something found by itself in the world. The world in Plato is a world of shadows, and the ideal world is elsewhere – it is the stamp of truth in the Numinous Ground of Being. 

These symbols – substance, attributes, universals, particulars, etc. – were used to evoke meanings in the minds of the people of Europe until the end of the medieval era.  The Ark of the Categories passed on from generation to generation by the traditions of scholastic philosophy, but it disappeared in the post-Descartian period when Science and British Empiricism brought about a new age. And in India, the great traditions of Nyaya Shastra suffered when the children of Aryavarta left the institutions of a timeless Gurukula system to seek knowledge from an education system brought to them by Macaulay. A soul that looks at the world through virginal eyes, unclothed by the webs of extraneous theories, sees the categories. Socrates had said that a thing is red in color for no other reason except for the participation of ‘ideal redness’ in the thing. This is the fundamental ground on which logic stands – that a thing is what it is due to itself and not on account of another. 

The categories are the fundamental stuff – the ancient and timeless Logos – which makes the universe. Everything that we see around us is nama rupa (name and form). Name and form are synonymous with word and object, and the term ‘padartha’ derives from the two words – pada (word) and artha (object).  Padarthas are the building blocks that go into the foundational structure of the universe, made of name and form. The padarthas are to be known by turning our attention to the acts of cognition of the objects rather than by the construction of theories built on the unexamined structure of the elements that lie in the acts of cognition. These padarthas are constituents of the vritti when the mind and senses conform to the form of the object; one cannot find them by looking for them outside after the vritti forms. The act of looking makes the senses and mind conform to different kinds of objects through different kinds of vrittis. And this brings us to a fundamental difference between science and Indian Traditional Philosophy. 

Indian traditional philosophy strives to reveal the nature of objects. Science seeks to construct theories to explain the nature of objects. The former grounds in revealing; the latter in theory construction. The difference between the two stems from a fundamental difference in their attitudes toward knowledge. In Indian traditional philosophies, one seeks knowledge from within. In science, one seeks knowledge from outside. There exists an almost unbridgeable gulf between contemporary science and traditional Indian philosophies. Hence, we should follow the method advocated by the Vedic tradition, or at least abide by some minimum set of guidelines having common ground with the traditional epistemologies, when we discuss topics related to Vedanta.

THE TRADITIONAL PROOF

There are two kinds of proof offered in the Vedic tradition to show that the Vedas are apaurusheya. One is a philosophical proof based on Mimamsa. The tradition also offers an alternate proof that does not depend on knowledge of Mimamsa. The strength of the proof lies in this very fact that it does not rely on evidence that comes from the Vedas, and hence it avoids circularity of reasoning. At first sight, the proof may not appear to be a proof at all: it is simply the fact that there happens to be an unbroken tradition that holds the Vedas to be unauthored. But despite its seeming naivety, it is an incontrovertible proof. Of course, whether a scripture is paurusheya or apaurusheya would make no sense to a person who does not believe in scriptures.   

The Vedas were once the heart of a living tradition, governing every aspect of human life and infusing it with a sense of inspiration and sublimity. There is a misconception among some people that the Vedas are unauthored because they are not known to have had any human author. The expression ‘not known’ indicates a failure to know. The tradition says that the Vedas are known to have no human author. The former indicates a failure to know the author, whereas the latter asserts knowledge about its unauthoredness. 

Authoredness, by its nature, is perceptible to the senses. Unauthoredness, by its nature, is not perceptible to the senses. Therefore, perception is the wrong means of knowledge (pramana) to know about unauthoredness. It has to be known by some other means. In order to appreciate the distinction mentioned above, we may consider an analogous case: that of abhava (non-existence). Merely not perceiving an object does not indicate its nonexistence, because the object may actually be existent and we may have failed to perceive its existence. There is thus a separate pramana in Advaita Vedanta called ‘anupalabdi’ for ascertaining the non-existence of an object. The correct articulation of the traditional position is that the unauthoredness of Vedas is an object of knowledge and not an absence of knowledge of its author.

DIVERSE STRANDS OF THE THEME OF UNAUTHOREDNESS

• Central Core of the Tradition
• Dual-Categorization of Language
• Extensiveness of the Tradition
• The Field of Action: Preservation of Sound

The Central Core Of The Tradition

There are three aspects to the central core of the timeless tradition that holds the Vedas to be unauthored. 

        1. Unbrokenness of the tradition

There is an unbroken tradition from the past that holds the Vedas to be unauthored by humans. There has been no point in history when anyone has claimed authorship of the Vedas. On the contrary, every seer, every great person, has only confirmed their unauthoredness. 

        2. Etymology of the word ‘rishi’

Tradition says that the Apaurusheya Vedas irrupted into the mundane world at two stages: (i) at the stage of creation when Ishvara revealed it to Brahma; and (ii) during the early stages after creation, in Krita yuga and Treta yuga, when the Rishis saw it during their tapas. Now, as regards the manifestation through the rishis, the root of the word ‘rishi’ indicates the manner of its manifestation. The Vedanga related to Etymology is Nirukta. ‘Rishi’ comes from ‘being a seer’:  ‘rishi darshanath’. So, the very word ‘rishi’ has its origin in the event of ‘seeing’, of being a drshta (seer).  And at both points of irruption, i.e., during creation as well as post-creation, they had no human author because, firstly, Ishvara, who revealed them, is not human and, secondly, the rishis who gave them to the world saw them and did not create them.

        3. Existence of multiple rishis for the same mantra (the immune system)

Every Vedic mantra is associated with three things: a rishi (the seer of the mantra), a devata (the god who presides over the mantra), and a chanda (the meter of its chanting). The Vedas contain many mantras, or even entire suktas, revealed to multiple rishis—from two to a thousand. The multiplicity of rishis for the same mantras forms the core immune system that guards the tradition of unauthoredness against counter-claims. It is like a Copyright for unauthoredness that prevents anyone from claiming authorship of the mantras. The Vedic mantras are the common property of the universe and none, neither a mortal nor a god, can claim their authorship.

Dual-Categorization Of Language

The entire texture and flavor of our worldview are determined by the language we use. The apaurusheyatva of the Vedas is present in this most basic seat of learning and was an element of culture permeating the consciousness of the entire populace. The idea of apaurusheyatva of the Vedas was the prime factor due to which language itself was categorized into two types: the language of the Vedas (Vaidika) and the language of mortals (laukika). The two primary vidyas related to language- Vyakarana (Grammar) and Nirukta (Etymology) had as their fundamental ground the apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. 

Grammar (Vyakarana)

The refinement of a language is determined by the perfection of its grammar. No other language has a grammar as perfect or as refined as that of Sanskrit, as acknowledged by scholars across time and space. In Panini’s Ashtadhyayi, the base work of grammar, its first sutra contains the notion of dual categorization of words: “atha sabdanusasanam“. 

Patanjali’s Bhashya explains this as: Now (follows) the instructions of words. The word ‘atha’ indicates the commencement of the topic. The action of instruction has for its object, ‘the words’ of the laukika and the Vaidika. There, the laukika are: cow, horse, man, elephant, beast, Brahmin, and so forth. There, the Vaidika are – sanno devir abhistaye (may the shining good be for the sacrifices (A.V.1.1.6)); ise tvoraje tva (I cut thee for libation and strength (Y.V.1.1.1)); agnim ile purohitam (I adore Agni, the leader (R.V.1.1.1); Agna ayahi vitaye ((Oh Agnim, may thou come for drinking the clarified butter (S.V.1.1.1). In giving the example of laukika words, words have a separate and random mention. But in giving the example of Vaidika words, the definite order in which they occur is extremely crucial, and it is for that reason that the illustrations of Vaidika words are in the form of sentences in which they occur.

Etymology (Nirukta)

In Nirukta, the study of Etymology, the origin of every word is ultimately traced to Vedic Sanskrit. Indeed, the Nirukta begins with a list of Vedic words called the Nighantu. ‘Having been repeatedly gathered together from Vedic hymns, they have been handed down by tradition.’ (Nirukta.1.1). The Nirukta also contains a direct reference to the apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. It mentions the Vedas as seen (through direct insight by seers) and not as something created or authored. Thus, the idea of the Vedas being apaurusheya is in the most basic and primary seats of traditional learning.

Extensiveness Of The Tradition

The idea of apaurusheyatva of the Vedas has pervaded all the six traditional schools, starting from their original texts themselves. It also extended to other branches of learning too.

Purva Mimamsa / Uttara Mimamsa

Jaimini Purva Mimamsa Sutras (1.5, 1.27. 1.30, 1.31) says that there is an eternal connection between the word and its meaning. The objection that the Vedas have a human origin is groundless. The names mentioned are on account of the person explaining them. The different parts of the Vedas are named after those sages in their honor. The names of persons used in the Vedas are common nouns and not proper nouns. The person bore the names subsequently (in the cycles of creation). So, this argument of the objector does not detract from the eternality of the Vedas. Similarly, Vedanta Sutras (1.28, 1.29, 1.30) say: the universe arises from this (i.e., from Vedic words), which direct revelation and inference prove. This very fact follows the eternality of the Vedas. And there is no contradiction, since similar names and forms repeat even in the revolution of the world cycles, as is known from the Vedas and Smriti. 

Sankhya / Yoga

Samkhya darshana too considers the Vedas to be apaurusheya. Sankhya Karika (Sutras 4 & 5 as elucidated by Bhashya of Vachaspati Misra): …Verbal Testimony is the statement of trustworthy persons and the Vedas. Verbal testimony is self-authoritative; it is always right as it is authored by the words of the Vedas, not authored by any human being and therefore free from all defects. It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from smrti, itihasa, and purana is also right because they have the Vedas as their source. Yoga follows all the basic tenets of Samkhya except for some subtle differences. While Samkhya is silent with regard to Ishwara, Yoga considers Ishwara to be a special Purusha equipped with the powers of creation, sustenance, and destruction of the universe. 

Nyaya / Vaisesika

The expression ‘apaurusheyatva of the Vedas’ has a slightly different connotation than in the other traditional darshanas. In Nyaya, the term ‘apaurusheyatva’ means ‘having no human author’.  It does not indicate the second qualification, ‘eternality’, as it does in Mimamsa. Nyaya Kusumanjali of Udayanacharya shows the correct position of Nyaya with regard to the Vedas: The right knowledge caused by testimony is one produced by a quality in the speaker, viz., his knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used; hence, proving the existence of God, as He must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda. Thus, there is no human authorship ascribed to the Vedas in Nyaya-Vaisesika either. 

The Other Vidyas

The idea of apaurusheyatva of the Vedas exists in the other two Upangas (Purana and Dharma Shastra) too. There are eighteen major puranas and as many subsidiary puranas. The accounts of creation mention that Brahma creates the universe through tapah on the Vedic words, showing that the Veda (or Vedic words) predates creation. Bhagavata Purana, for example, says: “The Lord (Vishnu) said: O Brahma who holds the Vedas latent in you! I am highly pleased by your long and concentrated meditation for enlightenment on the work of creation. (Bh.Ch.9.19)”

The class of texts known as the Dharma Shastra is Smriti. Though the word ‘Smriti’ often refers to a broad class of literature, including the Puranas and Itihasas, it strictly refers to the Dharma Shastra alone. “By the Sruti is meant the Veda, and by Smriti the Dharma Shastras: these two must not be called into question in any matter, since from these two the sacred law shone forth.” (MS.II.10) The Manu Smriti refers to the Veda as the ‘eternal Veda’ and also mentions that the names of created beings were according to the words of the (eternal) Veda. 

The diverse traditional branches of learning sufficiently show that the idea has permeated into the entire fabric of Vedic culture. This phenomenon should have been common knowledge to us – to at least those of us who are born in this culture, but unfortunately, modern education seems to have severed us from our roots.

The Field Of Action: Preservation Of Sound 

The preservation of Sound (the Vedic hymns) in its phonetic and metrical purity is directly based on the special significance of the Vedas as Sruti – the Eternal Sound. The very idea of safeguarding it as a vehicle that carries the Supreme Knowledge is grounded in the Vedas as being uncreated, unauthored, perfect, and faultless. What other reason can make an entire civilization devise its education system to provide extensive training to guard the purity of the Vedic sound against being corrupted? What other reason can make so many people in a society or a civilization undertake such onerous tasks as learning to pronounce the Vedas for 10 years or 15 years to protect its purity? And we are not speaking here of a small segment of society, but of a large section of the population stretching across the length and breadth of Bharatvarsha.  

Continued in Part 3