In part 1 and part 2, we saw the author’s proof of the self’s existence through its power of jnana shakti and kriya shakti. He also sets the verifiability criteria for his proof. In this section, the author describes the Indian traditional view of the Self and the issues related to the non-Self. He also lays the foundational basis of the logic which sets to refute the western criticisms of the notion of the soul in the final part.

THE NATURE OF THE SELF- ETERNAL AND INDESTRUCTIBLE

The author now elucidates in detail the nature of the Self in Indian philosophical traditions. The self is not an object; it is the subject that cognizes objects. That which is cognized is the object. Material things are objects cognized through the senses. Thus, because it is not a material thing, the senses can never perceive the self. The self is also not an object of thought. Anything thought in the mind would stand known to the self, the cognizer, as a cognized thing and would thus not be the self. Thus, none of the qualities or attributes perceived belong to it. Thus, describing the self can only be in negative terms as being entirely devoid of any kind of form, parts, and attributes.

Without form, it cannot change from one form to another form; without parts, there is no change of any internal configuration; and without attributes, there is no difference between what it was, what it is, and what it will be in the future. Destruction entails a change from being existent to non-existent. That which is changeless cannot change from one condition of existence to another. The self is therefore unchanging and indestructible.

Consciousness Is the Self, The Subject, The Referent of The Word ‘I’

Consciousness accompanies every experience. In every experience, the expression “I know” denotes the state of being conscious. In the sentence “I know a cow”, “I know” denotes the state of being conscious and the latter part of the expression- “a cow”, denotes the object that the subject ‘I’ is conscious of. Even those experiences in the form ‘I am happy”, “I feel pain”, and so on, are cognitive states as a knowledge of being happy or in pain that accompanies the mental state of being happy or in pain. This is because consciousness is self-revealing and a consciousness accompanies not only the things experienced but also of the experience itself. In a certain sense, it may be that even a robot or AI is ‘seeing’ or ‘hearing’ something like a human being but it is only the latter that has a self-awareness that says ‘I know that I see or hear.’ Consciousness’s own special power of self-luminosity or self-consciousness reveals to us its presence in every experience we undergo.

Change pertains to objects of consciousness only. The changeless consciousness cognizes the change. Expressions such as “presence of consciousness” and “absence of consciousness” refers to the presence or absence of objects on which consciousness shines and not consciousness itself. Deep sleep and death are therefore not conditions in which there is the absence of consciousness; they are states with no objects to reflect consciousness. The unchanging, eternal, and indestructible self has neither birth nor death.

The Self and The Non-Self

In the tradition of Western philosophy, the distinction between the self and the non-self is unclear and hazy. The soul (or the self) often conflates with the mind. Resultantly, consciousness and mind mean the same leading to confusion to define the ‘relationship between mind and matter’. The confusion between the terms ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ prevails unto this day. Western tradition’s attempts to grasp the true nature of the relationships between soul and mind, on the one hand, and between mind and matter, on the other has been only that of confusion. The treatment of these two different relations conflates into one single confusing ‘mind-matter’ relationship.

Indian traditions are clear on the conception of the self or the soul. The self is neither mind nor matter; it is pure spirit, formless, imperceptible, and inconceivable. Everything else, including the mind, is the non-self. While the self is a single entity bereft of parts or attributes, the non-self consists of three layers or domains of existence.

The Three Layers of The Non-Self

The first and most familiar layer is the domain of gross physical objects; objects known by means of perception. In Western philosophy, it has become problematic to maintain that perceived objects are physical objects on account of the stimulus-response theory of perception. The objects thus perceived would be subjective phenomenal objects and not external physical objects. Indian philosophical tradition espouses Direct Perception where the self directly perceives the external objects. The perceived world is a legitimate world of physical objects.

The second layer is the domain of ideas or ideated objects. The mind invokes the objects to appear by the mere exercise of an individual’s will. The relation between mind and matter refers to the relation between an object of ideation as it appears in the mind and the object, referred to by the same name, as it appears in the world of gross physical objects. The appearance of objects in these two layers does not pertain to two different objects but to two different conditions of existence of the same object. Thus, Indian thought resolves one of the most perplexing problems in the Western tradition- the relationship between mind and matter. In Indian philosophy, they are simply two existential conditions of an object denoted by a name.

The third layer is the domain of the unmanifest. This layer is the repository of all objects, albeit in their universal natures. Any physical or ideated object exists perennially in the layer of the unmanifest. It emerges into the world as a created object or in the mind as an imagined idea. There is no such thing as absolute non-existence of a legitimate object. Upon the destruction of any object, it simply becomes unmanifest and comes to abide in a state of formless rest. This layer is the region of universals wherein each object abides in its universal ‘form’; paradoxically, that universal form is formless. This layer is the nothing that is cognized in the state of deep sleep. Due to its formless nature, one mistakes the third layer as the self.

This objective reality, which consists of three layers of objects (triloka or three worlds), is the Prakriti. Purusha or the Self is the witness of the three worlds. Western philosophy does not make a clear distinction between the self and the three layers of objective reality. Thus, there is often a derailed reasoning for ascertaining the existence of the soul due to a lack of discrimination between consciousness and one of the three layers of objective reality.

On the Individual Self- Ego

The self is attributeless. That which is without attributes cannot exist as an individual thing. Therefore, in truth, there cannot be such a thing as an individual self. The individuality of the self does not derive from the intrinsic nature of the self; it is the result of an erroneous identification with the body. The notion of the individual self is parasitic upon the limited sphere of consciousness reflected off the intellect and the inner layers of the mind.

The limitedness of the sphere of reflected consciousness brings about the notion that the self is within the space of the body. The identification of the self with the intellect explains the notion of the limited self. However, this does not account for the unique individuality of the individual self. The uniqueness derives from the history of the soul’s actions and experiences in the passage of time.

The knowledge episodes of these experiences etch within the inner layers of the mind as a memory-repository. It is the uniqueness of this repository that provides the individual self with a unique identity. According to the philosophy of Vedanta, at a deeper level, the unique individuality of a soul derives from its adrshta, the balance of the effects of its past actions or karma. If there is no adrshta, there is no individual self.

The self is not the ego. The ego is the I-sense that appears in the mind and it belongs to the realm of the non-self. In the Indian tradition, it is known as the ahamkara, the form (akara) of the ‘I’ (aham). The ego is the medium through which the body gets appropriated as the self. It is the ego that sustains the facade of the self-being an actor in the world.

Will and The Arrows of Causality

The foremost question is about the existence of will. The question is whether there exists within living beings a power to exert extra-natural force to influence the behavior of physical objects. As the author shows previously, living beings do possess the power of exercising intentional force which not only invoke the motor organs into activity but organizes the motor organs for coordinated activity. This establishes the existence of the will.

In a purely physicalist framework, the arrow of causality would be from a physical body (or phenomenon) to another as both the cause and the effect would be attributes of physical bodies. The rejection of Cartesian dualism in contemporary culture has resulted in consciousness relegated to a position of an insubstantial non-entity. Thus, in the physicalist framework, the arrow of causality never originates in consciousness nor does it point to it. As an epiphenomenon, consciousness is an accompaniment of certain brain processes. Contemporary scientists and philosophers take the position of the physical causal closure argument – all phenomena in the universe have solely physical causes.

The existence of will in living beings dismantles the physical causal closure argument and establishes that the arrow of causality also points from consciousness to physical objects. Consciousness can exercise will and thereby cause changes to occur in physical objects unexplainable by physical causes alone. The notion of the physical world forming a causal closure is mere dogma.

The pernicious dogma needs to abandon to accept an incorporeal cause as a power that operates alongside the physical causes of the universe. The arrows of causality are not only from physical objects to other physical objects but also from the self to physical objects. It is important to understand that the presence of will as an extra-natural power does not impinge upon the validity of the physical laws. They both exist alongside each other.

On Free-Will and Determinism

Unfortunately, the debate on free-will verses determinism has characterized the presence of will and the presence of physical causality in terms of an either-or proposition. The problem thus lies not with the nature of the causes but by the postulation that the causes acting in nature can either be physical causes or a will exercising its freedom of action. The author calls it a mistake. They both exist together, interpenetrated with one another in reality. The exercise of will does not affect the validity of the physical laws any more than the presence of a magnetic force that causes a piece of iron to lift in the air affects the validity of the gravitational force that would be acting downward on the piece of iron.

The various forces act in accordance with the laws that are applicable to them, whether physical or incorporeal, but it is only the net effect of the forces that become obvious. The question of free will is towards knowing the extent to which it would be free in exercising its powers. Obviously, the will of a living being does not have unlimited power. The power of will limits to moving motor organs into activity, and the motor activities act on the external object in a manner that would serve the purpose of exercising the will.

The strength and vigor of the instrument (like the muscles or brain) limit the power of the will. In general, the freedom of will is like the freedom that an animal tethered to a pole by a rope has. Beyond the radius provided by the rope’s length, it finds its movement obstructed. A living being enjoys a certain radius of freedom beyond which there is a limiting of powers. The world and the external circumstances place constraints. There are also internal constraints in the form of mental predispositions whose forces and momentums have the potential “to carry off a person’s mind” and make it act along with the veneer of its desires rather than by the dictates of reason.

The force or impulse of desire caused by such internal mental tendencies can render the will a slave of its instincts and desires. Such a will is not free.  It is the state of will that exists in animals and other lower beings which retain the power of exercising their wills but do so as driven by their instincts, desires, and mental tendencies rather than by the exercise of intellect. The forces exerted by mental dispositions and tendencies belong to the non-self, that is, to prakriti and not to the purusha or the self.

Thus, a will held hostage to the tendencies of the mind (forces from prakriti) cannot be free. Free will must consist of exercising its powers and abide by its own independent nature. External forces, residing both inside the body and outside, should not be able to influence its exercise. What is its own independent nature? The self is of the nature of pure consciousness or pure knowledge. Therefore, in acting freely, the directedness of the actions that proceed from the will would be determined solely by the nature of the self, that is, by knowledge and the power of discrimination (viveka) that comes from knowledge, and not by the impulses of desire or the forces of mental tendencies.

Thus, the actions that proceed out of free will would be actions determined solely by the knowledge of the factors involved and a determination of what constitutes right action in the situation. Mental tendencies and desires should not propel the actions. One who acts in this manner through the exercise of his free will instead of by the impulses of desire or mental tendencies is acting in a noble manner (an arya way) in Indian traditions.

THE LOST ARK OF THE LOGOI: INDIAN LOGIC AND CONTEMPORARY LOGIC IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF REALITY

Aristotle enumerated the categories- the most general kinds, into which entities in the world divide. The following are the highest ten categories of things that exist ‘without any combination.’ (source:  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categories/)

• Substance (e.g., man, horse)
• Quantity (e.g., four-foot, five-foot)
• Quality (e.g., white, grammatical)
• Relation (e.g., double, half)
• Place (e.g., in the marketplace)
• Date (e.g., yesterday, last year)
• Posture (e.g., is lying, is sitting)
• State (e.g., has shoes on, has armour on)
• Action (e.g., cutting, burning)
• Passion (e.g., being cut, being burned)

There are two sorts of substance: a primary substance is, for example, an individual man or horse; the secondary substances are the species (and genera) of these individuals (e.g., man, animal). While all the ten categories are all equally highest kinds, primary substances have a priority since without them the others do not exist.

Aristotle apparently arrived at his list by distinguishing “different questions which may be asked about something” and noting “that only a limited range of answers can be appropriately given to any particular question”. A categorial realist approach provides the most general sort of answer to questions of the form “What is this?”, and providing for narrower definitions and distinguishing from other things in the same category. Scholastic philosophy too used the categories in its arguments of logic. Categories defined the legitimate ways in which we may speak about objects.

In the Post-Cartesian period, however, when the very existence of external objects became doubtful by an Indirect Realism, categories as descriptions of the world objects lost their legitimacy. Contemporary philosophers have done away with the categories, the basic constitutive elements of objects. With the development of modern science and philosophy, scientists and philosophers sacked and destroyed the categories of the logoi, which had once been the stable ground for philosophy. Science had no use for the categories. Philosophy, following the scientific paradigms, rejected the categories. Berkeley, Hume, and Nietzsche completely buried the categories in their writings.

Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, did restore some of the respect accorded to the categories but scientists were not much concerned with his ideas because what mattered to scientists was that the theories they constructed worked rather than that the philosophical justifications that made the principles they used possible. The author asks, what was the ground on which the categories became mere products of the fertile imagination? Was the inability to perceive an entity by itself an enough ground for its denial? This is a crucial point, but one which may not be obvious to a philosopher from the Western tradition because Western philosophy has never treated non-existence as an independent category.

But Indian logic has; and it has also provided the epistemic means to ascertain the non-existence of an object. In Indian logic, the mere absence of perception of an object is, by itself, an insufficient ground for denying the existence of the object. It needs another condition called the pratiyogin – its amenability to perception under the given condition. To declare that an object is non-existent on the ground of it being unperceived, it must have a prior possibility of perception if it were to exist.

A chair in front of me has the possibility of perception if it were to exist. The non-perception of a chair in front of me is a justifiable reason for me to claim that it is non-existent. But I cannot justifiably claim that a chair in the next room is non-existent on the ground that I do not perceive it because even if the chair were to be existent in the next room, the wall of the room would prevent me from perceiving it. Thus, to repeat, the claim of the non-existence of an object should therefore be based on the prior possibility of perception if it were to be existent. The capacity of perception if it were to exist is ‘pratiyogin’. And the means of obtaining knowledge of non-existence based on non-perception is ‘anupalabdi’. In western traditions, the non-perception of the soul simply translates into non-existence. In examining the refutations of the existence of the soul proffered by Post-Cartesian philosophers, the author abides by the principles of Indian logic.

As shown in ‘Natural Realism and Contact Theory of Perception’, in a veridical perception, the perception of the world and its objects are direct and transparent. Indian logic, which accepts perception as the first of the means of right knowledge (pramana), does not have the problems faced by the western traditions. In the latter, its locutions of the world divide into locutions of subjective phenomenal features of objects and locutions of external objects that cannot be known (noumenon) by first-hand experience. In Indian logic, there is no such division and one may legitimately speak about the perceived world as the real world.

There is thus no legitimate reason in Indian logic to dispense with the categories; rather, they form the bedrock of logic. The categories or padarthas as they are known in the Indian tradition are the irreducible word-objects that logically constitute the individual objects of the world, and they are held to be seven in number, namely dravya (substance), guna (attribute), samanya (universal), vishesha (particular), karma (action), samavaya (inherence) and abhava (non-existence). The predominant form of contemporary logic is formal logic in which it is the syntactical form (the proper construction) of the argument that determines validity rather than the semantic content (the meaning) of the argument (as in Indian logic).

In contemporary formal Logic, the goal is not truth; it is the preservation of truth-values from the parts to the whole. The goal of Indian Logic, on the other hand, is towards the right cognition of objects (yathartha-jnana) that linguistic expressions purport to speak about.  Contemporary logic, standing on the topic-neutrality of logic, keeps itself free from ontology (the reality). Nyaya, or Indian Logic, rejects this hypothesis and holds that reasoning is impossible in the absence of knowledge of the padarthas or word-objects.

The padarthas are the generality (equivalent to the categories of Aristotle) present in the objects themselves in the form of the basic irreducible elements that linguistic expressions point to. The explicit knowledge of the padarthas- padartha-tattva-jnana (the knowledge of the categories as principles) is mandatory to prevent fallacious reasoning. Nyaya, or Indian logic, based on the padarthas- the most fundamental set of word-objects, thus obtains a sweeping universality lending to it the power to conduct discourses on every topic of human interest that language can express.

In the final part, the author refutes the influential western philosophers’ rejection of the notion of the soul. He also rejects the arguments against Descartes’ idea of the soul by some western philosophers.