Dr Frank Morales, a Spanish-American, is a Hindu spiritual teacher and the president of the International Sanatana Dharma Society, based in Omaha, Nebraska. Their official website provides a solid overview of their vision and practises, which are grounded upon Sanatana Dharma and Vedic wisdom. His main point is to challenge the concept of Radical Universalism, which holds that all religions are the same. To obtain the acceptance of Western audiences, Hindu gurus travelling in the West tend to embrace the position that “all religions are the same.”

Dr Morales says that Sanatana Dharma is unique and traditional acharyas have maintained the unique identity.  In a 2004 essay titled “Does Hinduism Teach That All Religions are The Same?”, Dr Morales scathingly attacks this idea, arguing that it is not only alien to classical Hinduism but is also the primary cause of the Hindus’ debilitating weakness. This idea appears to be a dangerous alien import into Hinduism, and it is a philosophy that has weakened Hinduism to its very core. Unfortunately, many misinformed spiritual Hindu leaders are to blame for this misconception. In his zeal, Dr Morales manages to be harshly critical of gurus such as Sri Ramakrishna Paramhansa and Swami Vivekananda, who have been pretty much universal targets for Indian and foreign detractors throughout history.

In a meticulous rebuttal, Chittaranjan Naik takes on the task of critically scrutinising Dr Morales’ arguments because, beneath the veneer of praise and defence of Sanatana Dharma, there is a lack of knowledge. It undermines the nature of Sanatana Dharma and, in fact, aims to dethrone from Hinduism a universalism that has hitherto served as the framework for its message to humanity. According to Naik, the Hindu community is currently in crisis. While Dr Morales’ message that we must revert to a purer form of Sanatana Dharma is legitimate, his ardent attempt to rid Hinduism of the perceived evil of Radical Universalism goes too far. Naik demonstrates how Dr Morales contradicts Hinduism’s great universal vision and overarching syncretism, which encompasses all differences.

This essay is a three-part summary of Naik’s essay The Sword of Kali. Though this essay specifically arose as a response to Dr Morales’ thesis, it explicates many aspects of Sanatana Dharma in the framework of Advaita Vedanta in a lucid language. It also addresses the many intentional and non-intentional criticisms of Hinduism by intellectuals, both Indian and western, across time. Naik simply puts these criticisms as arising from a faulty understanding of Sanatana Dharma rather than from any deep sadhana.

Radical Universalism and Hindu Universalism

Dr Morales defines Radical Universalism as the repudiation of all religious differences. For him, the statement “all religions are the same” is equivalent with “all religions are exactly the same.” According to Naik, if Radical Universalism means that all religions are the same in terms of their attributes, beliefs, and practises, then it is clearly absent in Hinduism; hence, one is shooting at a non-existent target.

According to Naik, the premise that “all religions are exactly the same” is as meaningless as the expression “he is the son of a barren woman.” The plurality of religions indicated by the sentential-subject ‘all religions’ negated by the predicate ‘are exactly the same’ presents a meaningless word-combination. The predicative part of the sentence ‘are the same’ in ‘all religions are the same’ does not predicate identity, as Dr Morales believes, but rather a sameness that lies within the diversity of attributes found in the various religions. Dr Morales fails to understand the essence of Sanatana Dharma by presenting the actual universalism that exists in Hinduism (Hindu Universalism) as the misguided belief that all religions are exactly the same.

Though one might sometimes overlook a distressing tendency in Neo-Hinduism to reduce Hinduism’s profound universal principles to naive, and often inane, platitudes, Dr Morales does something more than this indiscriminate conflation of Radical Universalism with Hindu Universalism. On the way, he deprives Hinduism of some of its central tenets and disparages great Hindu saints such as Sri Ramakrishna. Thus, it is necessary to reveal the flaws in Dr Morales’ logic and then show that the origins of Hindu Universalism, which require a correct understanding, are found in its own texts.

On ‘Sameness’ and ‘Distinctiveness’

Dr Morales’ argument is examined by Naik in light of the fundamental principles of Nyaya, or Indian logic, which determine whether things are ‘same’ or ‘different.’ Modern logic is accurate only within the confines of mathematics. In A=B, A and B are variables that, in formal logical systems, apply to numerous objects in the world without regard to their type or nature. Modern logic does not acknowledge that the name ‘logic’ derives from the Greek ‘logos,’ which means ‘word,’ and that the intrinsic relationships between word-objects must determine logic’s operations. Analytical philosophy (or modern symbolic logic) sought but failed to do so. Vedic metaphysics and epistemology provide a more pure and pristine form of logic.

According to the Vedas, this world is nama-rupa (name-form). Name is pada or word. Form is artha or object. Therefore nama-rupa, the nature of the world, is pada-artha, or word-objects. The study of padartha is Nyaya shastra or logic. Nyaya is an upanga or subsidiary arm of the Vedas. Nyaya, unlike modern logic, does not accept a pure logic abstracted from the applied things. All rules of logic are the structural schemata of the objects themselves. And because the world is nama-rupa, or word-object, grammar, the relational structure of words, mirrors the relational structure of the objects in the world. There is thus no difference between the structural schema of the world and the structural schema of language because they are not two disparate things, but two aspects of one structure mirroring each other. Wittgenstein was one of the rare Western philosophers who had a glimpse of this truth.

Dr Morales starts with a wrong premise by assuming that the sense of the same as attributed to things denies the difference that persists between them. Differences in attributes do not necessarily make things different. An apple may be red or green, sweet or tasteless, large or small, but they are all apples. It is important to discern in what sense “sameness” exists amidst the variety and differences. “He is that same Devadatta,” asserts the sameness of the person, Devadatta, at different times and different places. Despite everything in the river water changing the next day, one says “it is the same river.”

Sameness and difference of things in Indian logic is in the light of the natures of samanya and vishesha (universal and particular); and dravya and guna (substance and attribute). Sameness is by samanya (universal) where the fundamental truth of a thing is that it is same with itself by virtue of its nature. A red thing is red not because of some other thing, but because of its redness. Thus, when sameness is in two different things, it is not due to any other reason than that the samanya of the attribute is present in both.

However, when we speak of the sameness of a single entity (such as a person or a river at different times), we are referring to the unitary existence of a thing’s multiple attributes- the substance (dravya). What we see as an existent entity is a substance, which has a variety of qualities in a single unitary existence. Now, the identity of a thing (substance) is derived not from the individual traits that characterise it, nor from the combination of these attributes, but from the samanya (universal) that identifies it. That is, an apple does not derive its identity as an apple by the redness, or the roundness, or the sweet taste, that describes it, nor by a combination of these attributes, but by the samanya that identifies it, namely “appleness.” Therefore, when we speak of substantial things, the samanya of the thing comprises a multitude of attributes within it without detriment to its unity.

Now Samanya presents itself to cognition as a particular instance of its manifestation. The manifestation of the universal (samanya) is therefore always a particular (vishesha). A specific is never existentially distinct from the samanya. Thus, there arises the hierarchy of genera and species as particulars of the universal and from which they are never different. All flowers are flowers due to the “flowerness” in them, even though a rose and a lotus are different from each other as particular kinds of flowers. In the act of perception, the natures of grasping “substances” and “universals” are in the stillness of perception. That stillness is the disassociation of the witness from the things he witnesses. Nyaya is a cleansing of the intellect so that it may sink back into its source, the heart, from which it sees the truth. In the philosophy of Nyaya, this is nihsreyasa.

Now, two things may have the same attribute even though they may be essentially different, i.e., an apple and a table may both be red, but they are entirely different. When two things are the same essentially (in substance), then it is the sameness of essence even though there may be differences in the attributes that inhere in them, i.e., two tables are the same essentially even though one may be red and the other white. It is in the latter sense that Hinduism says that all religions are the same.

Hinduism and Christianity are the visheshas (particulars) of the samanya (universal) called religion, and they possess the distinctive characteristics of their respective kinds. This sameness is the essence of religion that abides in them all. What is this essence? Religion is different from the sciences in one fundamental respect: it places the origin of the world in a living principle. Now, religions may differ in the way they name or describe this living principle, or in the relations they posit as abiding between the living principle and nature (the world). And it is in the way that this Living Principle is revealed in Hinduism that gives it its overarching universal vision.

By not distinguishing between the nature of differences and sameness, Dr Morales fallaciously denies not only Radical Universalism, which is not present in Hinduism but also Hindu Universalism, which is certainly present in Hinduism. Indeed, he says that the ultimate goal of each religion is a separate mountain that is completely different from, as well as isolated from, the mountains of other religions, an idea that is not only foreign to Hindus but is also one that does violence to Hindu thought.

The Disbanding of Logical Fallacies

Dr Morales’ case is persuasive and rhetorical, but it contains numerous logical inconsistencies. Naik goes through his arguments one by one.

• The Circular Logic Argument

Morales says, ‘If Hinduism is able to see that all religions are the same, then it becomes superior to other religions by virtue of this very vision (which other religions do not claim to see) and thereby it contradicts the claim that all religions are the same.’ This argument is based on the wrong assumption that the sameness of religions implies a lack of difference between them. Even if we should consider that Hinduism would become ‘superior’ by its vision that all religions are essentially the same, then such superiority would become a distinctive mark (vishesha or particular) not detrimental to the underlying sameness of religions.

• The Different Mountains argument

According to Dr Morales, the realities spoken about by different religions are so many different mountains. He claims that these religions take specific pains to disavow Brahman as being the God of their religions. Morales argues that for the many religions, there are many different philosophical “mountains”, each with their own unique claim to be the supreme goal. In reply, Naik says that the proof of Hindu Universalism is not by the expressions of parochialism that may exist in other religions. Morales’ logic is fallacious because it shifts the question of universalism in Hinduism, to something else- what other religions believe to be their goals.

• The Contradictions Argument

Two things that contradict each other cannot be the same. Morales contends that if the philosophical substance of one religion is correct, the prospect of the others being true is ruled out. If the philosophical content of one type is true, then the philosophical content of the other is manifestly false. Asserting that all religions are the same is as nonsensical as a “round square” or a “married bachelor,” according to Morales.

According to Naik, the first fallacy is using an inapplicable example as the foundation of an argument. ‘A round square’ or ‘a married bachelor’ are unitary phrases, and each must thus have a unitary meaning, which is clearly lacking in the examples given. The locus of the qualification ‘round’ is ‘square’, and the locus of the qualification ‘married’ is ‘bachelor’. Each qualification is contradictory to the corresponding locus. However, it is reasonable for two contrary attributes in two things of the same essential nature, like two differently shaped tables. Thus, despite their intrinsic similarity as faiths, it is not illogical for two religions to have contradictory features because they are located in two different loci.

The second fallacy arises due to the failure to look at Hindu Universalism through the prism of Hinduism. According to Vedanta, the sphere of logos (names and forms) is the operative domain of logical rules, whereas the Absolute is beyond the realm of names and forms. Contradictions apply to names and forms, but the Absolute exists beyond the pairs of opposites; it is the fundamental substratum from which the pairs of opposites emerge and dissolve. The contradictory features of various religions’ philosophical doctrines are apparent forms (many include opposites) of the same Transcendental Absolute.

Morales contends that only one of the beliefs about the Absolute in various faiths may be true based on reason, logic, theological coherence, and common sense. This is due to the fact that with each either/or statement, any one claim automatically entails the negation of a contradictory claim. However, because the Absolute is the Ground of propositions, either/or propositions do not control it, according to Vedanta. Dr Morales commits a category mistake when he says that the Absolute is either this or that. The Absolute appears in Hinduism not just as an anthropomorphic God, but also as the morphologies of all forms of life, including fish, tortoises, and lions. Finally, the non-dual Absolute does not negate the world’s plurality. The paradox dissolves in the vision of the world’s ineffable Oneness with Brahman. Morales commits a category error and thus falls victim to the fallacy of subjecting the Absolute, which is beyond logos, to logical rules that apply only to the category of logos.

The third fallacy in the Contradictions Argument arises due to a lack of perspicuity regarding the meanings of difference and contradiction. The assessments of various religions about the human existential dilemma are not contradictory to one another; rather, they differ in their assignations of causes to the human predicament. Different religions give different causes to ‘human degeneration,’ but Hinduism regards these causes as different stages in the unfolding of causality. Ayurveda, for example, believes that diseases are caused by an imbalance of the three doshas. Yoga delves deeper and discovers them in the obstructions to the flow of prana. Mimamsa goes even deeper and finds them in the workings of past karma. These causes are not contradictory to one another, but one is the manifest symptom of another deeper cause. Hinduism does not negate the original sin (or the fall) as being contradictory to avidya but sees it as a symptom of primordial avidya.

Astonishingly, Dr Morales brings up the Contradictions Argument considering that he finds an underlying unity in the staggering diverse sects and schools of Hinduism with innumerable differences. If Dr Morales’ argument were to be valid, then there would be no such thing left as Hinduism, given that its sects and schools have so many contrary claims regarding not only the nature of Reality but also regarding the means to the highest good.

• The Hermeneutics Argument

Dr Morales uses hermeneutic analysis to demonstrate that the Rig Veda sentence ‘ekam sad vipra bahudha vadanti’ is an ontological statement rather than an epistemological or soteriological one. This basic ontological statement reflects on the Absolute’s unitive essence, namely, that God is one. This may be true, but it hardly indicates that Hinduism never really had a universal vision, according to Naik.

As Naik says, a Hindu can either (1) believe that the reality spoken of by other religions is the same reality (Brahman), or (2) believe that the reality spoken of by other religions is a vacuous concept. Now the first option would result in universalism. Therefore, in order to prove that universalism never existed in Hinduism, it would be necessary to show that Hinduism considers the reality spoken about by other religions as vacuous concepts. But Morales does not even attempt to formulate such a proposition. Therefore, his blithe conclusion that universalism never existed in Hinduism is on insufficient logical grounds.

• The Etiquette Argument

‘To disrespectfully insist that all other religions are really just worshipping Brahman without realising it, and to do so in the name of respect and tolerance, is the height of hypocrisy and intolerance,’ Morales argues. A democratic vote or etiquette cannot provide an answer to the question of Hindu Universalism. A Hindu would surely be more disrespectful if he called the Gods of other religions vacuous concepts than if he said that he regards these Gods as facets of the same God to whom he prays!

• The Imposition Argument

This argument is founded on the grand delusion that Radical Universalists’ true objective is to intolerantly impose Brahman on all other non-Hindu religions. As advocated by modern, non-traditional Hindus, radical universalism would strive to deny people of other religions the freedom to assert their own religions as distinctive and different traditions. When it comes to the rights of other religions, Morales would have us believe that Hindus have the authority to impose their beliefs on them. Dr Morales has misinterpreted Hinduism in addition to presenting a fabrication as an argument. A Hindu does not push his beliefs on followers of other religions; rather, he maintains that a Christian would get closer to God by being a good Christian, and a Muslim would move closer to God by being a good Muslim.

Will be continued in Part 2