Who were the Purbiya mercenaries, sought after by rulers from Malwa to Gujarat and even the British East India Company? Known for their expertise in firearms, their recruitment was not merely a matter of military strategy but a cultural and strategic exchange that shaped the dynamics of regional politics and warfare. In ancient Indian literature, two terms, Bhritabal and Shrenibal, describe distinct types of military forces. Kautilya’s Arthashastra refers to six types of troops, which were hereditary troops (Maula), hired troops(Bhrita), corporation of soldiers (Srení), troops belonging to a friend or to an enemy, and wild tribes. Bhritabal refers to mercenary forces obedient to the king, while Shrenibal denotes guild forces comprising members from within the same country, often organized by traders or craftsmen. Kautilya’s Arthashastra emphasizes that Bhritabal were loyal to the royal commands, whereas Shrenibal’s loyalty lay with their guilds, potentially challenging royal authority. Evidences from literary sources like Panini’s Ashtadhyayi and inscriptions highlights guilds deploying soldiers, showcasing their dual role in economic and military spheres. This dual capacity of guilds as military assets and potential threats to royal authority is a recurrent theme in ancient Indian texts, cautioning rulers about their strategic deployment. Also, as historian Upinder Singh notes in “A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India”, this period was characterised by incessant warfare and the importance of coercive power and military might. Therefore, there was a need for skilled mercenaries in medieval India as kingdoms and empires constantly vied for dominance. The Purbiya mercenaries, with their formidable reputation, became highly sought after by various rulers. Their involvement was critical in many significant battles and campaigns, influencing the outcomes and territorial control. Originating primarily from the eastern regions of North India, notably Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, these became prominent during the Mughal era. Their name “Purbiya” itself is derived from the Hindi word “Purab,” more precisely they were from the region of Allahabad, Avadh, Buxar etc. The core region for Purbiya recruitment was the Bhojpur region of modern-day Western Bihar and Eastern Uttar Pradesh. The influence and presence of the Purbias, however, extended beyond these boundaries due to their significant role in military and political arenas across India. Historically, the term “Purbia” emerged to denote soldiers and clans from these regions who migrated westward in search of military employment during the medieval period. This migration was notably catalysed by the collapse of local kingdoms like the Sharqi Kingdom in the late 15th century, which disrupted existing power structures and forced warrior clans to seek opportunities elsewhere. The earliest references to them appear in Abu Turab Wali’s Tarikh-i Gujarat (completed around 1590), noting their role as gunners in Bahadur Shah’s army at Champaner in 1535. Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad in Tabaqat-i Akbari (1594) also mentions them as Rajput followers of Medini Rai, prominent during Sultan Mahmud Khalji’s rule in Malwa around 1516. These accounts are corroborated by historians like Firishta and Haji-ud-Dabir, writing circa 1607, indicating that they initially served in Malwa and later in Gujarat and Mewar by the early 1530s. Scholars like Dirk H.A. Kolff suggests that the Purbias were predominantly Rajput mercenaries who specialised in military skills, particularly in the use of firearms such as rockets and early cannons. Their earliest documented presence in historical records dates back to the early 16th century Persian chronicles, serving in the armies of regional powers like the Sultanates of Malwa and Gujarat. They were valued for their martial prowess and strategic acumen, often recruited in significant numbers to bolster the military capabilities of these states. Sixteenth-century chroniclers perceived them as mercenaries identified more by their regional migration than specific clans or lineages. While the majority of them were Rajputs, a notable presence of Brahmans emerged, particularly during the British period. These Brahmans belonged to the non-priestly, land-owning class. Conversely, other castes, such as the Yadavs, typically adhered to their traditional occupation of cattle-herding and generally refrained from soldiering, although they occasionally engaged in plundering when circumstances permitted. Hailing from parts of present day Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, this densely populated region had been a hub of Indian civilization for millennia, alongside Bengal, contributing significantly to the Mughal Empire’s revenue. Local rebellions here faced harsh reprisals, yet instead of quelling dissent, such brutality often emboldened the soldier-farmers. Armed with matchlocks, spears, and sticks, the Purbias staunchly resisted paying land revenue, often resorting to aggressive attacks against their rulers, sometimes uniting to capitalize on conflicts among external powers nearby. Over centuries, these clans allied and clashed with external powers, gaining from conflicts and enriching themselves with captured prisoners, plundered riches, and seized resources—a dynamic which ensnared Afghan rebels and Mughal princes like Khusro and Sulaiman Shikoh, and also piqued the interest of later British observers. In Mughal service, the burden of unjustly high land revenue forced many Purbia peasants away from their farms. Sons from Rajput families typically split between joining local landlord armies or travelling to Mughal power centres to enlist in imperial forces, where they exclusively served as infantrymen due to the region’s lack of indigenous horses and the expense of foreign mounts. By the sixteenth century, the matchlock became their standard firearm, used alongside cannons to repel charging cavalry or defend camp perimeters. Despite receiving no formal training, these infantrymen were categorized under the artillery department (mir-e-atish), excelling in firearms through local disputes and hunting expeditions, becoming disciplined marksmen. Mughal records identified them by towns and districts in eastern provinces; Aurangzeb recruited Kanojias (from Kannauj) but they were often termed Baksarias (from Buxar). Infact, many of these mercenaries carried out a pilgrimage to Buxar in modern-day Bihar where they would immerse themselves in a tiger tank. During this process, the young peasant would see themselves as being reborn as a “fearless warrior”. The Marathas referred to them as Hindustani, probably distinguishing them from Telugu infantry, while the British called them “Avadh and Buxar men.” Beyond infantry roles, they were garrisoned Mughal forts and guarded palaces and harems. Unlike Rajput soldiers from other regions, Purbias in the Mughal army lacked compact clan organization under their own Rajas or Thakurs, instead serving dispersed among various Mughal mansabdars’ armies. Yet, this did not diminish their spirit or ability to act together, often spurred by resistance to Mughal prejudices or oppression. In defence of their faith and against Aurangzeb’s discriminatory policies, they occasionally rebelled, especially those in Delhi, although only few instances are recorded in Mughal history. In 1669, when the Hindu saint Uddhav Bairagi was unjustly imprisoned, two of his Purbia disciples retaliated by killing Qazi Abul Mukaram. Similarly, in 1694, when Sri Krishna Bairagi was arrested and idols confiscated, they gathered and attacked the censor’s mansion, securing Bairagi’s release. Another incident involved Mirza Tafakkhur, grandson of the Wazir, who provoked a mutiny among Hindu artillerymen when he attempted to abduct one of their wives, resulting in his house arrest to restore calm. Moving beyond Delhi, the they played significant roles in broader regional conflicts. In Bengal, when the Marathas divided the Mughal Empire, Bhonsles of Nagpur took control of the province. Their cavalry clashed with the Bengal Nawab’s forces in 1742, which included Afghan rebels and Baksari infantry (Purbias). Despite initial setbacks, the alliance of Shia Nawabs and resilient Purbia infantry managed to defeat the Afghan rebels after a decade-long struggle, forcing concessions from Bengal to Orissa by 1752. Further north, in Avadh, infantry with these mercenaries as irreplaceable members became crucial to the Shia Nawab’s defence as other troops deserted or proved unreliable due to sectarian tensions. By 1764, the English, who dominated Avadh, trained and led these forces, enhancing their military prowess. In Delhi, Purbia infantry mutinied in 1756 over unpaid wages, demonstrating their collective strength by blockading the Red Fort until their demands were met. Similarly, in Lahore, these as artillerymen intervened decisively in 1755, protecting the local governor from mutinous Mughal soldiers. Across the Indian subcontinent, Purbia soldiers earned a reputation for discipline and marksmanship, awaiting only foreign training and leadership to transform into a formidable military force. In the mid-eighteenth century, amidst the political and military upheaval in France, significant advancements in artillery, musketry, and infantry tactics were brewing. This period saw French military adventurers leaving a profound mark on Indian warfare. Organising regular battalions for the kingdoms of Hyderabad and Mysore, these Frenchmen introduced new military doctrines. Meanwhile, the British East India Company, having gained control of Bengal, recruited Purbia’s as soldiers in Bombay and Bengal, while Telegus filled ranks in Madras. However, the British lacked seasoned cavalry, which was supplied by the Nawab of Arcot in Madras and later by Mirza Najaf Khan in Bengal after the Battle of Buxar in 1764. Khan, rising to become the Wazir of Delhi, formed a European-modelled army primarily composed of these soldiers, trained by the English but led by their own commanders like Gangaram and Bhawani Singh. French adventurers like Rene Madec and Lesteneau also joined this force, aiding Khan in campaigns against the Ruhelas and Jats, though his ambitious plans faltered against Jaipur. After Khan’s decline into debauchery, Mahadji Scindia of the Marathas assumed control, strengthening his influence over the Delhi Empire. With support from De Boigne and European-trained Purbia battalions, Scindia clashed with Rajput forces in Jaipur in 1787, relying on his overwhelming Maratha cavalry. However, financial constraints forced Scindia’s retreat, losing support from Purbia and Telegu battalions, however etaining European loyalty. In the subsequent battles, such as the Battle of Merta in 1790, De Boigne’s disciplined Purbia battalions proved instrumental against the Rajput cavalry, utilising superior artillery and infantry tactics. Despite initial setbacks, Rajput valour persisted, with intense fighting culminating in De Boigne’s strategic formations quelling Rajput resistance, leading to their eventual surrender. Following victories, De Boigne expanded his corps with additional brigades, earning promotion to Rank of General and enhancing his military apparatus with extensive artillery and logistical support. His corps, predominantly comprising recruits from Bihar and Awadh, operated independently from European regimental structures, yet attracted significant local enlistment, contributing to Scindia’s military dominance. During the third Anglo-Maratha war, the fate of De Boigne’s corps, composed predominantly of Purbia Rajputs, took a decisive turn. Initially aligned against the British, many Europeans within the corps defected early in the conflict, lured by English proclamations. Subsequently, the battalions, under leaders like Baji Rai Bhadauria and Sarwar Khan, found themselves defending key forts such as Aligarh and Agra, and engaging in pitched battles at Patparganj and Laswari. Despite their combat prowess at the tactical level, these mercenary soldiers struggled to achieve overarching success in the 1803 conflict. Unlike their European counterparts in the British East India Company (EIC), they lacked trained staff officers to strategize and coordinate campaigns effectively. This limitation hindered their ability to consolidate their military expertise into a cohesive power base within their native regions. Historically, smaller Purbia Rajput states like Sasni, Bhojpur, and Jagadishpur had maintained their autonomy through strategies such as withholding revenue and exploiting internal disputes among superior authorities. For instance, Raja Prithipat of Pratabgarh allied with the Ruhela invaders in 1752, demonstrating the political fluidity and opportunism among these states. The soldiers of these Rajas, even though of the same blood as those in the Bengal Army or in De Boigne’s Corps, were unable to hold their own in pitched battles on open ground. The military effectiveness of these states was curtailed by several factors. The most obvious reason was the poverty of these small states. Financial constraints prevented extensive training and the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, essential for sustained military operations. Additionally, the rural economy lacked the industrial capacity to produce firearms and gunpowder, relying instead on imports from urban centres under Mughal, Maratha, or British administration Moreover, the martial culture of these Rajput rulers, shaped by centuries of cavalry dominance in open battles, prioritised the formation of mounted forces over infantry units. This preference persisted even during significant uprisings like the 1857 revolt, exemplified by Kunwar Singh of Jagadishpur’s reliance on cavalry. During the Indian Rebellion of 1857, Purbiya units within the Bengal Army played a significant role in the uprising against British rule. Mangal Pandey, of the 34th Bengal Native Infantry, a prominent figure at the outset of the mutiny, was a Purbiya. In the aftermath of the rebellion’s suppression, British authorities made a strategic decision to halt the recruitment of troops from the eastern plains. Instead, the new Bengal Army focused primarily on recruiting from North Western ethnic groups, which included Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim communities from the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. While recruitment of these from western regions of the United Provinces and the Delhi area persisted, it was notably reduced in scale. By 1893, only two out of sixty-four regiments in the Bengal Army were recruited from these western Purbiya regions. Despite these limitations, the Purbias excelled in mercenarism, demonstrating unmatched accuracy in defending fortified positions and engaging in trench warfare. Over 2,000 mud forts across the region symbolised their resilience against invaders like the Afghans and Marathas, although eventually these fortifications succumbed to British efforts to assert control and consolidate power over the territories. The failure of these Rajput states to adapt swiftly to evolving military techniques, evident from 1750 to 1800, reflected broader challenges in transitioning from traditional to modern warfare methods. Unlike Europe, which had centuries to refine military strategies, they faced steep learning curves and economic constraints that limited their military efficacy in the face of advancing colonial powers. So, it will be unjust to blame our ancestors for not embracing modern warfare swiftly enough. They had only a brief span of fifty years (1750-1800) to grasp these new methods, whereas Europe refined its military strategies through centuries of trial and error from 1300 to 1600. They offer us broader insights into medieval Indian history, particularly regarding the dynamics of military recruitment, ethnic identities, and regional migrations. Their history shows how geopolitical changes, such as the fall of kingdoms and the rise of new powers, influenced patterns of military employment and community resettlement. Their evolution from local warriors in eastern India to specialised firearms experts in the service of multiple sultanates and later colonial powers demonstrates the adaptive strategies of communities in response to shifting political landscapes. 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